Andreea Gociman v. Loyola University of Chicago
41 F.4th 873
7th Cir.2022Background
- Three Loyola University Chicago undergraduates paid on‑campus tuition and mandatory fees for Spring 2020; mid‑semester Loyola suspended in‑person instruction and moved classes online due to COVID‑19.
- Plaintiffs sued as a putative class for breach of contract and, alternatively, unjust enrichment seeking refunds for the portion of the semester conducted remotely.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, reasoning the claims were barred as educational malpractice and that plaintiffs failed to identify a specific contractual promise; it also dismissed unjust enrichment because plaintiffs incorporated contract allegations.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit held the complaint plausibly alleged an implied‑in‑fact contract promising in‑person instruction and access to campus facilities in exchange for tuition and certain fees.
- The court found plaintiffs adequately pleaded breach as to tuition and to the Student Development and Technology fees, but not the CTA U‑Pass fee.
- The unjust enrichment count was dismissed for a pleading error (improper incorporation of contract allegations), but the court vacated that dismissal and remanded so plaintiffs may amend their unjust enrichment claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claims are barred as educational malpractice | Plaintiffs say they allege a contractual promise to in‑person education, not a challenge to educational quality | Loyola says the suit attacks the quality/substitute education and thus is educational malpractice | Majority: Not educational malpractice — claim targets an identifiable contractual promise, not instruction quality |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a breach of contract for tuition (implied‑in‑fact contract) | Catalog, registration portal, pre‑pandemic practice, and price differential show an implied promise of in‑person instruction | Loyola points to disclaimers/reservations and program differences to rebut any promise | Held: Complaint plausibly pleads an implied contract to provide in‑person instruction; survives motion to dismiss (merits and disclaimers reserved for later) |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded breach as to mandatory fees (Student Development, Technology, CTA U‑Pass) | Fees were paid for on‑campus services; loss of access supports breach | Loyola argues services (esp. tech support) continued or fees do not guarantee access | Held: Student Development and Technology fees — plausible breach; CTA U‑Pass — not pleaded as impaired, so no claim |
| Whether unjust enrichment survives as alternative claim | Plaintiffs alleged retention of tuition/fees for services not rendered | Loyola: contract governs, so unjust enrichment inapplicable | Held: Unjust enrichment could proceed in the alternative, but plaintiffs’ complaint improperly incorporated contract allegations; dismissal vacated in part and plaintiffs given leave to amend on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard and reasonable inferences)
- Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.) (student‑university relationship is contractual; must identify specific promise)
- Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599 (7th Cir.) (student must specify source and promises forming implied contract)
- Shaffer v. George Washington Univ., 27 F.4th 754 (D.C. Cir.) (similar COVID‑era implied‑contract pleadings allowed to proceed under D.C. law)
- Mashallah, Inc. v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 311 (7th Cir.) (pleading alternative claims and limits on incorporating contract allegations)