Andrea M. Weaver, N/k/a Wheeler, V Brandon M. Weaver
48957-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | May 31, 2017Background
- Parties: Andrea (Wheeler) Weaver (appellant) sought attorney fees after superior court modified the parenting plan with Brandon Weaver (respondent).
- Superior court entered the modification order on December 11, 2015; Wheeler’s counsel attempted settlement by email but received no agreement.
- Wheeler filed a motion for attorney fees on February 9, 2016, more than 10 days after entry of judgment.
- Trial court denied the fee motion as untimely under CR 54(d)(2) and denied Wheeler’s later motion to extend time and motion for reconsideration.
- Wheeler appealed, arguing CR 54(d)(2)’s 10‑day deadline should yield to (a) the best interests of the child standard, (b) public policy favoring settlement, (c) a ‘‘reasonable time’’ standard, or (d) RCW 26.09.140’s "from time to time" language.
- Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the 10‑day CR 54(d)(2) deadline controls after entry of final judgment and that RCW 26.09.140 does not extend that deadline; motion to enlarge time failed for lack of excusable neglect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wheeler) | Defendant's Argument (Weaver) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether best interests of the child standard governs post‑modification fee motions | Best interests should apply to fee awards in parenting matters | Statutory best interests standard applies only to parental‑responsibility allocations, not fee awards | Rejected — best interests standard does not apply to attorney fee awards; RCW 26.09.140 requires consideration of parties’ finances |
| Whether public policy favoring settlement excuses CR 54(d)(2) deadline | Delay caused by settlement attempts should toll or excuse the 10‑day rule | CR 54(d)(2)’s plain 10‑day deadline is mandatory unless statute or court order provides otherwise | Rejected — public policy cannot override clear court rule language |
| Whether a ‘‘reasonable time’’ standard should replace CR 54(d)(2)’s 10‑day limit | Rule should be read to allow motions within a reasonable time after judgment | CR 54(d)(2) explicitly requires filing within 10 days unless statute/court order says otherwise | Rejected — court enforces the unambiguous 10‑day deadline |
| Whether RCW 26.09.140’s ‘‘from time to time’’ authorizes later fee motions after final judgment | ‘‘From time to time’’ allows fee motions at any time, modifying CR 54(d)(2) | RCW 26.09.140 allows interim fees during pendency but does not expand post‑judgment filing deadlines | Rejected — ‘‘from time to time’’ does not alter CR 54(d)(2); allowing unlimited post‑judgment motions would be absurd |
Key Cases Cited
- North Coast Elec. Co. v. Signal Elec., Inc., 193 Wn. App. 566 (court rules interpreted like statutes)
- Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wn.2d 520 (principle that court rules/statutes given plain meaning)
- In re Marriage of Persinger, 188 Wn. App. 606 (statutory interpretation and legislative intent in family law)
- Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654 (strong public policy favoring settlements)
- Seafirst Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Erickson, 127 Wn.2d 355 (public policy on settlement encouragement)
- In re Marriage of McDermott, 175 Wn. App. 467 (avoidance of absurd statutory results)
- Clipse v. Commercial Driver Servs., Inc., 189 Wn. App. 776 (standard for CR 6(b) enlargement; abuse of discretion review)
- In re Marriage of Young, 18 Wn. App. 462 (balancing need and ability to pay for appellate fee awards)
- Eagle Sys., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 181 Wn. App. 455 (definition of frivolous appeal for fee awards)