51 F.4th 1033
9th Cir.2022Background
- San Diego parking officers place an impermanent chalk mark on the tread of one tire of every vehicle in a given area to enforce posted time limits; if the mark remains after the time limit, the vehicle may be cited. The mark typically rubs off after a few tire rotations.
- The City has used chalking since at least the 1970s and defends it as a cost‑effective, administratively efficient method that advances traffic flow, public safety, air quality, and commercial turnover; alternatives (photography, LPR) are costlier or raise privacy/data concerns.
- Plaintiffs Andre Verdun and Ian Anoush Golkar received chalk‑based parking citations and brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging chalking violates the Fourth Amendment; they sought an injunction and damages.
- The district court held chalking is a Fourth Amendment “search” but permissible under the administrative (special‑needs/dragnet) search exception and granted summary judgment for the City.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: assuming chalking is a search, it falls within the administrative search exception by analogy to motorist checkpoint/dragnet doctrine and is reasonable under the required balancing test.
- A dissent (Judge Bumatay) would hold chalking a search and unconstitutional under the original understanding and argued the administrative exception is limited to uniquely pressing, exceptional public‑safety interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether chalking is a Fourth Amendment "search" | Chalking is a physical intrusion on a vehicle (tire) to obtain information, so it is a search | City assumed or argued the practice is permissible; majority assumed arguendo that it is a search and moved on | Majority: assumed (without deciding) chalking is a search; treated the case on that assumption |
| Whether chalking’s primary purpose is general crime control (per se invalid under dragnet cases) | Plaintiffs: chalking is a suspicionless dragnet that serves law‑enforcement aims and thus is impermissible | City: primary purpose is traffic/parking management (public safety, turnover), not general crime control | Held: primary purpose is administrative (traffic/parking management), not general crime control; not per se invalid |
| Whether chalking is reasonable under the administrative/special‑needs exception (balancing gravity of public interest, degree advanced, intrusion severity) | Plaintiffs: intrusion is a search that requires individualized suspicion or at least stricter limits; alternatives exist and chalking is not justified | City: chalking serves substantial municipal interests, is tightly tailored, practicable, and is a de minimis intrusion | Held: practice is reasonable—serves significant public interests, is appropriately tailored and practicable, and minimally interferes with liberty; summary judgment for City affirmed |
| Whether historical/originalist limits bar the administrative exception (and therefore chalking) | Plaintiffs/dissent: Fourth Amendment originally rejected suspicionless general warrants; administrative exception should be narrowly confined to uniquely pressing emergencies | City/majority: precedent governs; administrative/search‑checkpoint doctrines apply broadly by analogy; historical claims do not refute established precedent | Held: majority rejects the originalist argument as insufficient to displace longstanding administrative‑search precedent; dissent would have invalidated chalking |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (physical‑occupation/trespass theory: government physical intrusion on property to obtain information can be a Fourth Amendment search)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (use of a drug‑sniffing dog in curtilage was a property‑based physical intrusion constituting a search)
- City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015) (administrative/search exceptions and warrant requirements overview)
- Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (dragnet/checkpoint stops invalid when primary purpose is general crime control)
- Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints upheld where primary purpose was roadway safety)
- United States v. Martinez‑Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (immigration checkpoints upheld under special needs/administrative doctrine)
- Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (checkpoint to solicit information about a recent hit‑and‑run was permissible; purpose was closely tied to the harm)
- United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ninth Circuit upholding a wildlife/park checkpoint by applying motorist‑dragnet analysis)
- Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483 (6th Cir. 2021) (contrary holding: chalking not covered by administrative‑search exception)
- United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (administrative searches must still be reasonable in scope and execution)