Andre Eugene Sanders v. Commonwealth of Virginia
64 Va. App. 734
Va. Ct. App.2015Background
- Newport News police received anonymous tips in June and September 2012 that Sanders was possessing/distributing drugs from identified motel rooms; the same anonymous source had provided accurate information earlier.
- Officers surveilled the motel; Sanders was linked to Room 236 (June) and was a registered guest in Room 217 (September); officers recovered a room key on Sanders when they stopped his vehicle in June.
- Detective Brown deployed a trained narcotics dog, Whiskey, to sniff the exterior walkways/door seams and the exhaust portion of an operating AC unit outside the rooms; Whiskey positively alerted both times.
- Based in part on the canine alerts (plus corroborating facts and, in September, Sanders’ admission), officers obtained warrants and searched the rooms, recovering marijuana, cocaine, paraphernalia, and cash.
- Sanders moved to suppress, arguing the warrantless dog sniffs outside his motel doors were Fourth Amendment searches under Florida v. Jardines; the trial court denied suppression, he conditionally pleaded guilty, and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Sanders' Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a dog sniff on the external walkway outside a motel room door is a Fourth Amendment "search" requiring a warrant | Dog sniff on the doorway/walkway is like Jardines — an intrusion into curtilage/home that requires a warrant | A canine sniff of the exterior/common walkway is not a search; officers had a right to be on the walkway and the sniff only revealed contraband | Not a search; canine sniff on motel external walkway did not violate the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether motel external walkways qualify as curtilage under Dunn factors | Walkway is adjacent to the rented room and thus entitled to curtilage protection | Walkways are common areas, open and visible, without steps taken to exclude others, so not curtilage | Walkways are not curtilage: open, common, and not within an enclosure or protected from public view |
| Whether the dog sniff disclosed noncontraband private information | Dog sniff could reveal intimate details of home life, implicating Jardines' property-based trespass concerns | A properly conducted sniff detects only odors of contraband that have escaped into public airspace | Sniff only detected odors intermixed with public airspace and revealed only contraband—so no reasonable privacy interest implicated |
| Whether Jardines controls and invalidates these sniffs | Jardines makes canine sniff on porch a search because officers intruded on curtilage/property | Jardines applies to single-family curtilage; it does not transform lawful presence in common motel areas into an unlawful search | Jardines does not control; officers and dog were lawfully on common walkways, so no Jardines-type trespass/search |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (front-porch dog sniff amounted to a property-based Fourth Amendment search)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy)
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (property trespass doctrine remains a basis for Fourth Amendment search analysis)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (distinguishing curtilage from open fields for Fourth Amendment protection)
- United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (canine sniff of luggage is sui generis and not a search)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (dog sniff during lawful traffic stop does not implicate legitimate privacy interests when it reveals only contraband)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (using technology to detect lawful as well as unlawful activity inside home can be a search)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable)