669 F.3d 161
4th Cir.2011Background
- Anderson sued the United States under the FTCA in Maryland federal court for negligent medical care at the VA Hospital in 2002.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on Maryland § 5-109(a)(1) as a five-year repose.
- Anderson alleged the FTCA limitations were preempted by federal law; the court certified the Maryland question on whether § 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of repose or limitations.
- The district court noted tolling provisions and Burnside v. Wong (Md. 2010) suggesting § 5-109(a)(1) may be a repose statute, and dismissed.
- Anderson filed this appeal contesting the characterization of § 5-109(a)(1) as a statute of repose.
- The order certifies the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals to determine the nature of § 5-109(a)(1) and its interaction with the FTCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Md. § 5-109(a)(1) a statute of repose or a statute of limitations? | Anderson argues § 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of limitations. | The United States contends § 5-109(a)(1) is a statute of repose. | Court certifies Maryland to decide the characterization. |
| Does the FTCA preempt Maryland's § 5-109(a)(1) if it is a statute of repose? | FTCA limitations would preempt a state repose bar. | If § 5-109(a)(1) is a repose, FTCA does not preempt its effect. | Question certified; not decided here. |
| Do tolling provisions in § 5-109(f) affect whether § 5-109(a)(1) functions as a repose or limitation? | tolling shows § 5-109(a)(1) is not a pure repose. | Tolling is part of the statute's balance and not dispositive. | Not resolved; Maryland to address. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Fitzgerald, 501 A.2d 27 (Md. 1985) (identifies § 5-109 as medical malpractice statute of limitations and discusses 'injury' trigger)
- Rivera v. Edmonds, 699 A.2d 1194 (Md. 1997) (discusses § 5-109 as potentially repose-based; ambiguity in its application)
- Burnside v. Wong, 986 A.2d 427 (Md. 2010) (cited regarding interpretation of § 5-109 in Burnside’s analysis)
- Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 1152 (Md. 1991) (describes § 5-109 as aim to bar malpractice actions within five years)
- Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 545 A.2d 658 (Md. 1988) (discusses § 5-109 as reinforcing repose policy)
- Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 808 A.2d 508 (Md. 2002) (notes tolling aspects within § 5-109 context)
- Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association, 785 A.2d 361 (Md. 2001) (describes § 5-109 as statute of repose)
- Jones v. Speed, 577 A.2d 64 (Md. 1990) (discusses injury trigger for § 5-109; treatment of discovery)
- First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizes Maryland § 5-108 as repose; informs FTCA context)