Anderson v. State
2017 Ark. 357
Ark.2017Background
- In 2007 a jury convicted Anderson of five counts of committing a terroristic act and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm for shooting into a crowded nightclub; aggregate sentence 1,320 months.
- Anderson previously appealed; the convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
- Anderson filed (pro se) a motion to amend a declaratory-judgment action and a petition to correct an illegal sentence under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111, arguing the terroristic-act statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-310, is unconstitutional.
- He contended § 5-13-310 is internally inconsistent (different subsections allegedly define the elements differently) and that the information failed to give notice that the offense requires an occupiable-structure target.
- The circuit court denied relief; Anderson appealed and moved for appointment of counsel. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed, rendering the counsel motion moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 5-13-310 is facially unconstitutional due to internal inconsistency | § 5-13-310(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2) conflict in element definitions, rendering the statute unconstitutional | Statute presumptively valid; Anderson failed to develop authority or facts showing unconstitutionality | Court rejected challenge; Anderson failed to meet heavy burden to show facial unconstitutionality |
| Whether the charging information failed to provide due-process notice (occupiable-structure element) | Charging instrument did not notify that a terroristic act must target an occupiable structure | No authority or developed argument showing denial of notice or due process; statute can be construed constitutionally | Court found no demonstrated due-process deprivation; argument unpreserved/unsupported |
| Whether § 5-13-310 is void for vagueness or overbroad | (Implicit) statute is ambiguous/overbroad | Overbreadth doctrine limited (mainly First Amendment); Anderson's conduct plainly fell within proscribed conduct | Court declined to apply vagueness/overbreadth; Anderson was not an "entrapped innocent" and provided no supporting authority |
| Whether sentence is illegal under § 16-90-111 because statute is unconstitutional | Sentences are illegal because based on allegedly unconstitutional statute | Sentence illegality statute requires sentencing to exceed statutory maximum; Anderson's sentences did not exceed maximums | Court held sentences were not illegal on their face and denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., 401 S.W.3d 466 (Ark. 2012) (presumption of constitutionality; heavy burden on challenger)
- McLane S., Inc. v. Davis, 233 S.W.3d 674 (Ark. 2006) (court will construe statutes to preserve constitutionality)
- Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (facial invalidation of statutes is strong medicine used sparingly)
- Drummond v. State, 897 S.W.2d 553 (Ark. 1995) (courts prefer a fully developed adversary record before invalidating a statute)
- Raymond v. State, 118 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. 2003) (requirements to show vagueness or overbreadth in facial challenge)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (limits on facial-overbreadth doctrine)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (void-for-vagueness standards for penal statutes)
- Bowker v. State, 214 S.W.3d 243 (Ark. 2005) (vagueness inquiry tied to facts and the "entrapped innocent")
- Williams v. State, 268 S.W.3d 868 (Ark. 2007) (court will not consider unsupported arguments without authority)
- Bell v. State, 522 S.W.3d 788 (Ark. 2017) (sentence is illegal on its face only if it exceeds statutory maximum)