Anderson v. State
2013 Ark. 332
| Ark. | 2013Background
- Michael Lee Anderson was convicted by a jury in 2007 of five counts of terroristic act and one count of felon in possession of a firearm; aggregate sentence 110 years. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Anderson filed a timely pro se Rule 37.1 postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the trial court denied relief and Anderson appealed pro se.
- Primary claimed errors: counsel failed to challenge (1) the criminal information, (2) the jury instructions, and (3) the sufficiency/preservation of a directed-verdict/sufficiency argument. Anderson also for the first time argued the information created a jurisdictional defect because the charged elements did not constitute a crime.
- The information and jury instructions tracked the elements of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-310 as printed in the hard-copy Arkansas Code in effect at the time; there was confusion between the hard-copy and an electronic version of the statute.
- Trial evidence included eyewitness testimony that Anderson and an accomplice shot wildly inside a nightclub, wounding several patrons; the trial court found the evidence supported the terroristic-act elements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anderson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was counsel ineffective for failing to challenge the criminal information? | Information omitted elements (conveyance/occupiable-structure language) and misled defense; lack of notice. | Information tracked hard-copy statute; was sufficient to apprise defendant; not a jurisdictional defect. | Counsel not ineffective; information sufficient and statute made the conduct a crime. |
| 2. Was counsel ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions? | Instructions followed the electronic statute and omitted elements; deprived Anderson of jury trial on each element. | Instructions tracked hard-copy statute in effect; counsel reasonably relied on that text. | Counsel not ineffective for declining to challenge instructions that tracked hard-copy statute. |
| 3. Was counsel ineffective for failing to make a sufficient motion for directed verdict (preserve sufficiency)? | Motion was inadequate to preserve issue on appeal; counsel should have raised specific sufficiency defects. | Evidence supported jury question on each element; a meritless motion would not constitute ineffective assistance. | Counsel not ineffective because the evidence supported the convictions and any directed-verdict motion would not have been meritorious. |
| 4. Did the trial court lack jurisdiction because the charged elements did not constitute a crime? | (Raised for first time on appeal) The information’s omissions meant the statute did not criminalize the alleged conduct. | Not a jurisdictional defect; the charged offense is a crime under the hard-copy statute. | Not a jurisdictional defect; claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (benchmark two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104 (presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within wide range of reasonable professional assistance)
- Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18 (definition of reasonable probability to show prejudice affecting confidence in outcome)
- Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421 (requirements for sufficiency of a criminal information)
- McCraney v. State, 2010 Ark. 96 (discussing standards for evaluating counsel’s omissions)