423 P.3d 197
Wash.2018Background
- Sheila Rosenberg (minor) and boyfriend attended parties, then went to coach Igor Lukashevich’s house after midnight; coach served vodka shots; both students later died in a single-car crash with high BACs.
- Lukashevich was a 22‑year‑old high‑school girls varsity coach hired by Soap Lake School District; he met WIAA minimum coach qualifications; background checks returned clear.
- District policies (employee handbook, Activities Code) prohibited student alcohol use and prohibited staff from having alcohol around students; evidence about whether coach received or was instructed on these policies was sparse or disputed.
- Plaintiff Michele Anderson (individually and as administrator of Rosenberg’s estate) sued the district for negligent hiring/retention, negligent training/supervision, negligent protection, vicarious liability, and breach of contract (Activities Code). Trial court granted summary judgment for district; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court affirmed.
- Court framed governing legal questions: standards for negligent hiring/retention, negligent supervision/training (including Restatement §317 elements), foreseeability for negligent protection of students off campus, scope‑of‑employment for vicarious liability, and whether the Activities Code created a contractual duty beyond existing legal duties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Negligent hiring/retention | District negligently hired/kept an unfit coach given lack of degree/credentials and risk to students | Coach met WIAA minimums; district ran background checks; no evidence district knew or should have known coach was unfit | Summary judgment for district — no genuine fact issue that hiring/retention was negligent |
| Negligent training/supervision of employee | District failed to train/supervise coach about alcohol and off‑campus contacts with students | No evidence district knew of particular dangerous tendencies; coach acted outside scope of employment; training/supervision claims fail | Summary judgment for district — plaintiff didn’t show employer knew or should have known of particular employee risk required by §317 |
| Negligent protection of student (duty/foreseeability) | District’s policies and prior off‑campus events made off‑campus alcohol risks foreseeable and created duty to protect students | No evidence of on‑campus negligence or foreseeability that coach would serve alcohol at midnight and allow intoxicated departure; event too remote from school activities | Summary judgment for district — no genuine issue that injury was foreseeable or that district breached duty while student in custody |
| Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) | District is vicariously liable for coach’s actions | Coach acted for personal reasons, outside scope of employment; district policies forbade alcohol around students | Summary judgment for district — no genuine fact issue that coach acted within scope of employment |
| Breach of contract (Activities Code) | Activities Code created enforceable contractual duty to protect athletes from alcohol-related harms | Activities Code did not create duties beyond existing legal duties; it is an adhesive form but not a contract imposing new protective obligations | Summary judgment for district — no contractual duty distinct from legal duties |
Key Cases Cited
- Scrivener v. Clark College, 181 Wn.2d 439 (procedural standard for summary judgment review)
- Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39 (elements of employer duty to control employees; negligent supervision analysis)
- Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35 (scope of employment analysis)
- In re Det. of Coe, 175 Wn.2d 482 (police reports inadmissible hearsay)
- Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School District, 71 Wn.2d 17 (off‑campus event tacitly authorized by school can give rise to liability)
- Coates v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 55 Wn.2d 392 (off‑campus event not school activity, no district liability)
- N.L. v. Bethel School Dist., 186 Wn.2d 422 (foreseeability and school duty to protect may extend to off‑campus harms)