90 F. Supp. 3d 667
S.D. Tex.2015Background
- Tammy Anderson was hired by Houston Community College (HCC) in April 2010; Johnella Bradford was her supervisor.
- Anderson filed an EEOC Charge on November 6, 2011, received a right-to-sue notice April 16, 2012, and sued HCC and Bradford in Texas state court on July 16, 2012 (Anderson I) alleging race/sex discrimination and retaliation.
- Anderson filed a second EEOC Charge on October 3, 2012, received a right-to-sue notice September 9, 2013; the state court granted HCC and Bradford summary judgment on October 4, 2013, dismissing Anderson I with prejudice; that judgment was affirmed on appeal.
- Anderson filed the present federal suit (Anderson II) on December 9, 2013 raising substantially the same discrimination and retaliation claims under TCHRA, Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983, plus an additional claim that she was transferred on January 1, 2013 to a menial position.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment in Anderson II on res judicata grounds, arguing all claims (including the January 2013 transfer) arise from the same nucleus of operative facts and thus were or could have been litigated in Anderson I.
- The district court concluded the four elements of res judicata were met for all claims (including the January 2013 transfer) and granted defendants’ motions, dismissing Anderson II.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Anderson II’s claims duplicative of Anderson I are barred by res judicata | Anderson argued most claims are identical but the Jan 2013 transfer is new and occurred after Anderson I was filed and after she obtained the right-to-sue | Defendants argued all claims, including the Jan 2013 transfer, arise from the same series of transactions and could/should have been raised in Anderson I | The court held res judicata bars the claims: the parties, jurisdiction, and final judgment elements were met and the transactional test covered the 2010–2013 events |
| Whether the January 2013 transfer is a "subsequent wrong" not precluded by res judicata | Anderson contended post-filing retaliatory acts are exempt and she lacked a right-to-sue until Sept 2013, so the transfer should be litigable | Defendants argued the transfer occurred before final judgment and within the same transaction nucleus; Anderson could have amended or sought a stay to preserve the claim | The court held the Jan 2013 transfer was part of the same nucleus of operative facts and thus precluded; lack of an earlier right-to-sue did not excuse res judicata because amendment or a stay was available |
| Whether right-to-sue timing prevents preclusion | Anderson relied on receipt date of the right-to-sue letter to justify separate suit | Defendants relied on procedural options (amendment/stay) and that mere waiting for the letter does not defeat res judicata | The court held right-to-sue timing alone does not defeat res judicata; plaintiff should have sought a stay or amended within the state-case amendment window |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2004) (transactional test for res judicata and discussion of subsequent wrongs)
- Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) (elements of res judicata)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment and reasonable jury inference standards)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (standards for genuine dispute and summary judgment)
- Blair v. City of Greenville, 649 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (subsequent wrongs doctrine for retaliation claims)
- Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc., 549 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1977) (successive retaliation suits for more recent acts permitted)