Anderson v. Hobbs
2013 Ark. 354
Ark.2013Background
- Marvin Anderson pleaded guilty to rape (offense date Feb. 13, 1997) and received a 30-year sentence; previously imposed concurrent 10-year sentences for carnal abuse were ordered served consecutive to the rape sentence.
- ADC calculated his carnal-abuse sentences made him eligible for transfer earlier, and that his 30-year rape sentence began on September 6, 2000 (uncontested by Anderson).
- Using Arkansas Code § 16-93-611 (as in effect when the offense occurred), ADC determined Anderson must serve 70% of the 30-year rape term (21 years) before parole/transfer eligibility — giving a transfer-eligibility date of Sept. 5, 2021.
- Anderson filed a pro se declaratory-judgment motion arguing ADC applied the wrong statute and that the 70% requirement should not block his eligibility for transfer to community punishment; he also raised constitutional/ex post facto and other statutory arguments.
- The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied the motion; the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding ADC applied the law in effect at the time of the offense and Anderson failed to offer persuasive authority or coherent argument to the contrary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which statute governs transfer/parole eligibility for Anderson? | Anderson: ADC should use § 16-93-1301 (transfer statute) and not apply the 70% requirement from § 16-93-611. | ADC: Parole/transfer eligibility is governed by law in effect at the time of the offense; § 16-93-611 (70% rule) applied. | Court: § 16-93-611 in effect when offense occurred governs; ADC applied it. |
| Whether § 16-93-611 requires 70% served before community-punishment transfer | Anderson: The statute should not be read to bar community-punishment transfer before 70% served (relies on post-offense amendment language). | ADC: The pre-amendment § 16-93-611 already operated to require 70% before parole/transfer for designated crimes. | Court: No evidence legislature intended otherwise; 70% requirement applied to parole/transfer. |
| Ex post facto challenge to applying § 16-93-611 | Anderson: Applying an amended interpretation violates ex post facto protections. | ADC: The agency applied the statute (Act 1326 of 1995) that was in effect when the crime was committed. | Court: No ex post facto violation because the 70% law was in effect when the crime occurred. |
| Sufficiency of appellant’s arguments and authorities | Anderson: Cites various rules/statutes and argues invalidity/unconstitutionality but offers little coherent authority or analysis. | ADC: Relies on statutory text and timing of the law; procedural posture supports agency calculation. | Court: Arguments unsupported by authority/improperly developed are not considered; summary denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ventry v. State, 318 S.W.3d 576 (Ark. 2009) (court will not consider arguments lacking citation or convincing legal analysis)