Anderson v. Hebert
2011 WI App 56
| Wis. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Anderson, a Barron County former employee, sues for defamation after leaving employment and after county officials accused him of misconduct.
- Circuit court held Anderson's defamation claim was barred as the exclusive remedy under the Worker's Compensation Act (WCA).
- Anderson resigned following an investigation and audit revealing overcharges to the state for highway maintenance.
- Hebert, the county administrator, made statements to media and at a county board meeting asserting misconduct by Anderson.
- District courts and the appellate court consider whether post-termination defamation falls within the WCA’s exclusive remedy.
- Court reverses summary judgment, determining WCA is not Anderson’s exclusive remedy and issues of material fact remain on substantial truth and actual malice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the WCA exclusive remedy bar post-termination defamation claims? | Anderson argues post-termination defamation is outside the WCA's exclusive remedy. | County contends the WCA bars defamation claims, including post-termination. | WCA exclusive remedy does not apply to post-termination defamation. |
| Are Hebert's statements substantially true to defeat defamation claim? | Anderson disputes the truth of some statements and argues context matters. | County asserts statements are substantially true based on audits and reports. | Summary judgment inappropriate; genuine issues on substantial truth exist. |
| Was there actual malice by Hebert for public-figure liability? | Anderson as limited-purpose public figure must show actual malice; material facts remain. | County contends no malice shown. | Genuine issues of material fact exist on actual malice; summary judgment inappropriate. |
| Are the post-termination defamation issues governed by precedents like Wolf, Farady-Sultze, or Pederson? | Post-termination defamation not categorically barred by these precedents. | Some precedents support exclusive remedy or align with post-termination context. | Cases distinguished; neither wholly controls post-termination defamation in this context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wolf v. F&M Banks, 193 Wis. 2d 439 (Ct. App. 1995) (debates whether defamation is within the Act; material post-termination aspects not controlling)
- Farady-Sultze v. Aurora Medical Center, 327 Wis. 2d 110 (Wis. App. 2010) (defamation post-termination not automatic exclusive remedy; lack of evidence of defamation)
- Pederson & Voechting v. Kromrey, 201 Wis. 599 (Ct. App. 1930) (post-termination injury analysis supports Anderson's position)
- Secor v. LIRC, 232 Wis. 2d 519 (Ct. App. 1999) (illustrates post-termination injury nexus considerations)
- Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Wis. 586 (Wis. 1917) (historical context on employment relationship during injuries)
- Jenson v. Employer's Mutual Casualty Co., 161 Wis. 2d 253 (Wis. 1991) (involves injury timing relative to termination in worker's compensation context)