Anderson v. Divris, 138 F.4th 625

Bruce Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts in 1989 and sentenced to life without parole; he lost on direct appeal and then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied on the merits.
Anderson was represented by the same attorney—Stephen Hrones—at trial, on direct appeal, and during his first federal habeas petition.
In 2019, Anderson filed a second federal habeas petition, alleging that Attorney Hrones provided constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal.
The district court dismissed the petition as "second or successive" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), requiring appellate authorization to proceed, which Anderson did not obtain.
Anderson appealed, arguing that because his lawyer had a conflict of interest, he did not have a meaningful opportunity to assert ineffective assistance claims in his first petition; the First Circuit considered whether this exception should exist.
The district court also denied a Rule 60(b) motion as untimely, and Anderson challenged this denial on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Anderson's new habeas petition "second or successive" under § 2244(b)?	Not "second or successive" because conflicted counsel denied him opportunity to raise claims.	Petition is "second or successive"—conflict does not excuse bar.	Yes, it is "second or successive" under § 2244(b).
Does lack of meaningful opportunity (due to lawyer's conflict) change this?	Yes, should be exempt to ensure at least one fair federal review.	No, AEDPA intended to bar nearly all successive petitions.	No, AEDPA doesn’t provide exception for such conflict-based cases.
Should the court grant relief under Rule 60(b) for defective earlier proceeding?	Delay justified because no non-conflicted counsel until recently; should excuse late filing.	Relief is untimely; delay not excused; no defect in prior process.	District court did not abuse discretion; denial affirmed.
Should the court follow the Third Circuit (Lesko) in exempting conflicted claims?	Yes, as in Lesko, conflict should exempt claim from bar.	No, historical and statutory practice treat these as successive.	Declined to follow Lesko; upholds bar on successive petitions.

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (second or successive applications are a term of art; some later claims are not barred)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (second petitions not barred if first dismissed for non-merits reasons)
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine for second petitions)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (newly ripened claims sometimes not "second or successive")
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (clarifying threshold determination of what is "second or successive")
Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020) (AEDPA's purposes, finality, and exceptions discussed)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) motions in habeas context)