Anderson v. Colorado
887 F. Supp. 2d 1133
D. Colo.2012Background
- Troy Anderson, an inmate in CDOC, has been in administrative segregation at CSP since 2000 after prior confinement beginning in 1991.
- CSP is a high-security supermax facility; inmates in administrative segregation have extreme isolation and limited outdoor exposure.
- Anderson has not had outdoor exercise for approximately 12 years, with only brief, supervised indoor-outdoor exposure historically.
- Plaintiffs alleged Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment, plus ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, related to mental health care and access to programs.
- Defendants argued medication decisions and treatment are medical judgments, and that AR 650-03 and CDOC policies provide due process and program structure.
- Trial occurred April 30 to May 8, 2012, with briefing as to new CDOC regulations (Austin-Sparkman/NIC report) addressing long-standing concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of outdoor access/exercise for 12 years violates the Eighth Amendment | Anderson; denial is a serious deprivation of a basic need | CDOC actions were permissible safety/operation decisions | Yes; denial was cruel and unusual punishment |
| Whether Anderson received adequate mental health care under the Eighth Amendment | Inadequate medication/treatment for ADHD/antisocial personality disorder | Medical judgments and formulary constraints allowed continued care | No; court requires reevaluation by a CDOC psychiatrist; order to reassess treatment |
| Whether Anderson has a protected liberty interest in progression out of administrative segregation | Two-tier/three-tier system creates expectancy of advancement | Policy did not create a constitutionally protected entitlement | Yes; There is a liberty interest based on conditions and duration; due process required |
| Whether the QLLP/OMI progression and administrative reviews violated due process | Chronological recording and reviews were unfair and non-meaningful | Policy changes could cure deficiencies; reviews could be meaningful | Partially; new Progressive Management policy improves process but prior chron/ASR flaws noted; not entirely moot |
| Whether ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were proven or foreclosed by medical judgment | Disability status and access to treatments denied | Disputed medication needs; treatment decisions within medical discretion | Not proven; court ordered reevaluation but ADA/§504 claim not established at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 F.3d 337 (U.S. (1981)) (defined minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities for Eighth Amendment)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. (1994)) (deliberate indifference standard for prison conditions)
- Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1987) (outdoor exercise importance in segregation; not per se violation)
- Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) (outdoor exercise rights in segregation contexts)
- Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (liberty interest in progressing out of confinement under CIR/segregation systems (Toevs I))
- Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2012) (Toevs II—clarified due process review in progression cases)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (U.S. (2005)) (extreme confinement can create liberty interests)
- Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 2012) (assessing extremity/duration of confinement and liberty interests)
- Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (constitutional obligation to provide medical/mental health care)
- Langley v. Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (surrogate care when prison medical access is limited)
- Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007) (multifactor test for liberty interests in segregation)
- R. v. CDOC (Austin-Sparkman/NIC report), - (2011–2012) (institutional standards for outdoor recreation in segregation)