Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A.
463 Mass. 299
| Mass. | 2012Background
- Anna executed a 1941 will creating a trust (ACB trust) for her son, grandsons, and issue; the 1941 law defined adopted children conservatively for inheritance purposes.
- The 1958 amendment to § 8 changed the rule to include adopted children in “child” definitions unless the instrument stated otherwise; effective for instruments executed after Aug 26, 1958.
- The 1969 amendment extended the inclusion to grandchild/issue/heir terms and provided a savings clause for vested interests before Aug 26, 1958.
- The 2009 amendment made the 1969 definitions retroactive to all testamentary instruments, effective July 1, 2010.
- Plaintiff Rachel Bird Anderson is the biological great-grandchild of Anna; Marten and Matthew are adopted brothers. David, Anderson’s father and one of Anna’s grandsons, died in 2007; Anderson began receiving 25% of trust income in 2007; Marten and Matthew previously received nothing because pre-1958 construction excluded adopted issue.
- Trust income distribution changed in 2010 after trustee notified that the 2009 amendment would include Marten and Matthew as “issue.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive application of the 2009 amendment is constitutional. | Anderson has vested rights harmed by retroactivity. | amendment serves public interest and is a valid evidentiary rule. | Retroactive application not reasonable; constitutional concerns prevail. |
| Whether the 2009 amendment is an evidentiary rule vs. substantive change. | Rule affects vested expectations and rights. | Rule is evidentiary, not vesting substantive rights. | Rule treated as evidence; but retroactivity still questioned. |
| Whether plaintiff’s rights vest prior to 2009 amendment. | Anderson’s income started in 2007, vesting before 2009. | Vesting depends on statute interpretation; not clear. | Anderson’s rights vested pre-2009 amendment; retroactivity burdens rights. |
| Nature of public interest supporting retroactivity. | Aim to equalize adoption vs. biological inheritance is important. | Gap in decades and compensation planning undercuts public need. | Public interest weakly supports retroactivity. |
| Extent and tailoring of retroactive impact on rights. | Retroactivity greatly dilutes Anderson’s substantial interests. | Broader societal goal justifies broad impact. | Retroactive application not narrowly tailored; unreasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Billings v. Fowler, 361 Mass. 230 (Mass. 1972) (vesting and retroactivity discussed in context of § 8)
- New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Groswold, 387 Mass. 822 (Mass. 1983) (interpretation of § 8 and vested rights)
- Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dean, 361 Mass. 244 (Mass. 1972) (interpretation of interests/vested rights under § 8)
- Watson v. Baker, 444 Mass. 487 (Mass. 2005) (historical context of adoptive issue rules)
- D’Amario (State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. D’Amario), 368 Mass. 542 (Mass. 1975) (vested rights and admissibility of adoptive issue)
- American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181 (Mass. 1978) (retroactivity reasonableness balancing framework)
- Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780 (Mass. 2008) (reasonableness in retroactive statute application)
- Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650 (Mass. 1987) (retroactivity in property vs. evidentiary rules)