Anderson v. AIG Life & Retirement, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1371

Background

William A. Anderson worked for AIG beginning in 2003 and filed suit in 2014 alleging race discrimination and retaliation under § 1981, Title VII, and the ADA based on events dating back to 2012.
AIG moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, to stay and compel arbitration, relying on arbitration language in a 2003 Sales Employee Employment Agreement and a signed 2008 Sales Employee Agreement that incorporated AIG’s Employee Dispute Resolution (EDR) Plan.
Anderson signed an “Applicant’s Understandings and Authorizations” form in July 2003 acknowledging that employment or continued employment constituted acceptance of the EDR program; he also signed an employee acknowledgement of the EDR program on July 28, 2003.
The EDR Plan and the Agreements broadly covered employment-related claims, expressly listing Title VII, the ADA, and § 1981, and stated the FAA governs the plan; AIG retained the right to amend the plan (the 2008 materials referenced 30 days’ prior notice).
Anderson challenged enforceability on several grounds: lack of initials/signatures, lack of adequate consideration (at‑will employment), illusory promises because AIG could unilaterally amend, ambiguity as to scope, and AIG’s alleged failure to honor the EDR “Open Door Policy.”

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the arbitration clause is enforceable despite missing initials/signatures	Anderson: lack of initials/some unsigned documents renders clause unenforceable under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9)	AIG: FAA governs and preempts Georgia initialing requirement; 2008 Agreement is signed and EDR states FAA applies	The FAA preempts Georgia initialing rule; arbitration enforceable
Whether continued at-will employment is adequate consideration	Anderson: continued at-will employment is inadequate consideration for arbitration agreement	AIG: mutual promises (job and AIG’s promise to be bound) supply consideration	Mutual promises constitute adequate consideration; enforceable contract
Whether the arbitration agreement is illusory because AIG can amend unilaterally	Anderson: employer’s unilateral amendment power makes agreement illusory and unenforceable	AIG: both parties expressly waived court remedies and AIG is bound; notice/30‑day provision limits amendments	Not illusory; AIG’s amendment power, with notice mechanisms, does not void mutual obligations
Scope and procedural prerequisites (Open Door Policy, grievance steps)	Anderson: documents ambiguous on statutory claims and AIG failed to honor Open Door Policy, affecting enforceability	AIG: documents and EDR plan clearly cover statutory claims; procedural steps are part of arbitration process	Scope covers Anderson’s federal claims; procedural questions (e.g., compliance with Open Door) are for arbitrator

Key Cases Cited

Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (FAA governs arbitration-agreement validity and federal policy favors arbitration)
Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005) (FAA preempts state law that treats arbitration agreements differently)
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms)
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (distinguishing challenges to arbitration clause itself from challenges to the contract as a whole)
Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (mutual exchange of promises is adequate consideration under Georgia law)
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (procedural gateway questions are presumptively for arbitrators)
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (employer’s right to change terms upon notice does not render arbitration promise illusory)
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002) (unilateral modification power in employer handbook not fatal where notice required)