Anderson v. AccuScripts Pharmacy, L.L.C.
2022 Ohio 1663
Ohio Ct. App.2022Background
- Anderson, hired May 1, 2018 as a pharmacy "toter," disclosed she had epilepsy and provided a list of medications; she worked from May 8 and was fired May 21, 2018 during her 90-day probationary period.
- On May 19, 2018 Anderson experienced heightened symptoms/an aura during an extra shift, asked about bringing her service dog as an accommodation, told her supervisor she was not feeling well, and then left the premises after sitting in her car until medication took effect.
- Employer (AccuScripts) maintained Anderson left without permission and terminated her for failing to complete the probationary period, citing attendance and performance issues.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for AccuScripts, finding Anderson had not submitted evidence that her epilepsy "substantially limited" major life activities under R.C. 4112.01(A)(13).
- Court of Appeals reversed: applying the then-current, expansive ADA regulatory definition of "substantially limits," the appellate court held (1) epilepsy can be a disability as a matter of law given episodic, active limitations, and (2) genuine issues of material fact exist about whether the employer's stated reason was pretext for disability discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Anderson's epilepsy is a "disability" under R.C. 4112 (i.e., substantially limits a major life activity) | Epilepsy is an enumerated impairment; when active (seizure/aura) it prevents breathing, speaking, seeing, working — so it substantially limits major life activities | Employer argued plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing a substantial limitation and that pre-2008, stricter ADA definitions remain instructive | Held for plaintiff: applying the then-current, broad ADA regulatory definition, episodic epilepsy that substantially limits activities when active qualifies as a disability as a matter of law |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on discrimination claim (i.e., no genuine issue of material fact) | Anderson presented evidence she was told to go home after reporting symptoms and requested accommodation (service dog); she contends termination was due to disability, not probationary performance | AccuScripts proffered nondiscriminatory reason — attendance/performance during probation — and argued no dispute of material fact | Held for plaintiff: genuine factual disputes exist (e.g., whether Anderson left with permission, employer's motive), so summary judgment for employer was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (plaintiff must show employer's stated reason is pretext)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio standard for moving party’s summary judgment burden)
- Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 (application of McDonnell Douglas in Ohio employment law)
- Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569 (Ohio courts may look to ADA/its regulations for guidance)
- Fitzmaurice v. Great Lakes Computer Corp., 155 Ohio App.3d 724 (impairment alone does not automatically establish a disability)
- Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016 (ways to show employer’s proffered reason is pretext)
- Bare v. Fed. Express Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 600 (discussion of ADA regulatory definition of "substantially limits")