Anderson, Rodney Young, WR-82,828-01

Background

Rodney Young Anderson was convicted by a jury (2009) of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (40 years) and aggravated assault of a public servant (life); convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Anderson filed a habeas application alleging the State withheld Brady material: (1) contemporaneous witness statements from Cory Brummett and Lindsey Paras that tended to show the officers were not identifiable as police, (2) the confidential-informant (CI) contingency/fee agreement for Jeffery Harmon, and (3) information about crime-scene technician Caryn McAnarney’s misconduct and role in evidence handling.
At the evidentiary hearing, defense presented testimony and exhibits suggesting: (a) Brummett’s and Paras’s February 11 statements lacked any recognition that officers were wearing identifying clothing; (b) Harmon told defense investigators he had been directed to target Anderson and may have had a contingency arrangement; and (c) McAnarney had been allowed to resign amid credibility/integrity concerns and may have collected or logged evidence inconsistent with trial exhibits.
The trial court found the State maintained an open-file policy, that copies of the disputed witness statements existed in the State’s file, and that Harmon’s confidential-source packet and the McAnarney-related evidence were not exculpatory or material.
Applicant objected to many factual findings, argued officers’ credibility and chain-of-custody for drug evidence were undermined, and contended suppressed material collectively undermined confidence in the verdict under Brady/Kyles.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State suppressed material exculpatory/impeachment statements by Brummett and Paras (Feb 11, 2008)	Anderson: Feb 11 statements showed witnesses did not identify officers as law enforcement and were material to the aggravated-assault element (knowledge) and to defense theory that defendants thought they were being robbed.	State: Files were open; statements were available for review; February 11 statements were not exculpatory or material because February 12 versions included clarifying detail.	Trial court found applicant did not prove by preponderance that statements were withheld and concluded they were not material or exculpatory.
Whether the State failed to disclose CI Jeffery Harmon’s contingency/fee agreement and related promises/dismissal of Harmon’s charges	Anderson: CI told investigators he was directed to target Anderson, payment increased with seized narcotics, and his pending case was dismissed after cooperation — all impeachment/favorable evidence that was not disclosed.	State: A blank CI packet was provided at trial; packet and a $200 receipt are in the file; the receipt and packet were not material to outcome.	Trial court found the CI packet/receipt were not exculpatory or material to the outcome.
Whether the State withheld material information about crime-scene tech Caryn McAnarney’s misconduct and her role in evidence collection/chain-of-custody	Anderson: Defense lacked timely notice of (a) McAnarney’s significant role in collecting evidence, (b) that she collected six white rocks that tested negative, and (c) her resignation for misconduct — all of which could undermine chain of custody and drug-evidence reliability.	State: Defense was notified in July 2009 of McAnarney’s termination; she would not be called and other witnesses established chain of custody; information about unrelated cases was not relevant.	Trial court concluded McAnarney’s unrelated misconduct would not have been relevant/admissible and that no material information was withheld.
Whether suppressed evidence, considered collectively, undermines confidence in the verdict (Brady/Kyles materiality)	Anderson: When taken together (witness statements, CI agreement, McAnarney issues), the suppressed evidence would have impeached State witnesses, questioned evidence reliability and plausibly altered confidence in the verdict.	State: Maintained open-file policy; items now in consolidated file; no proof that material favorable evidence was withheld pretrial or that it was outcome-determinative.	Trial court concluded no previously unresolved material facts remained and denied that suppressed evidence was material; no relief recommended.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality assessed by whether suppressed evidence undermines confidence in verdict; consider evidence collectively)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady includes impeachment evidence)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence relating to witness deals must be disclosed)
Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (favorable evidence standard; exculpatory and impeachment evidence defined)
Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Brady duty exceeds statutory discovery)
Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (materiality standard in Texas habeas context)
Ex parte Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (State includes law enforcement; withholding by police can violate Brady)
Blackmon v. Scott, 22 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 1994) (materiality and Brady framework)