Anderson P. Harris v. State
218 So. 3d 457
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2008 Harris pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling and received a 132.3‑month prison term with the last 48 months suspended contingent on 48 months probation (a true split sentence).
- Harris served the active incarcerative portion and was released to probation supervision.
- He was later charged with violating probation; he denied the violations and a non‑jury trial was held.
- The trial court found willful, material violations, revoked probation, and imposed a 180‑month sentence.
- Harris appealed, arguing the resentencing exceeded the suspended portion of his original true split sentence and thus was impermissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether original sentence was a true split | The 2008 sentence was a true split (prison term with part suspended for probation) | Implicitly conceded or not disputed | Court: It was a true split sentence |
| Whether court could impose a sentence greater than the original total after revoking probation | Harris: Upon revocation, court limited to original total (132.3 months) and cannot increase exposure | State: Upheld 180‑month sentence imposed after revocation | Court: Reversed — resentencing limited to original total (132.3 months) |
| Whether probation revocation itself was proper | Harris contested violations | State proved willful, material violations at bench trial | Court: Probation revocation affirmed |
| Remedy upon erroneous resentencing | Harris seeks reversal and resentencing within original limit, with credit for time served and counsel if eligible | State did not prevail on argument to affirm 180 months | Court: Affirm revocation; reverse sentence; remand for resentencing not to exceed original term with credit; appoint counsel if qualified |
Key Cases Cited
- Gibson v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 885 So. 2d 376 (explaining definition of a true split sentence)
- Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888 (definitional authority for split sentences)
- Boone v. State, 967 So. 2d 999 (trial court cannot impose incarceration exceeding suspended portion after revocation)
- Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746 (same principle regarding double jeopardy limits on resentencing)
- Bracero v. State, 14 So. 3d 1058 (remand for resentencing with credit for time served)
- Pressly v. Tadlock, 968 So. 2d 1057 (procedural guidance on resentencing after improper increase)