Anderson Ex Rel. C.A. v. City of Blue Ash
798 F.3d 338
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Ingrid Anderson kept a trained miniature horse, Ellie, at her home to assist her disabled daughter C.A. with balance and backyard exercise; C.A. has multiple disabilities and benefits from in-home hippotherapy.
- Blue Ash received repeated neighbor complaints about animal waste and unsanitary conditions; city officials ordered removal of multiple animals and ultimately passed Ordinance No. 2013-1 banning farm animals on residential property (with an explicit federal-law exception).
- Anderson was cited twice for keeping Ellie after the ordinance took effect, raised ADA and FHAA defenses in municipal court, was convicted (fines not imposed), and did not appeal.
- Anderson and HOME sued the City in federal court alleging (1) ADA Title II failure to make reasonable modifications and intentional discrimination, and (2) FHAA claims: failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, disparate treatment, and disparate impact.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City based on claim/issue preclusion and on the merits; the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claim/Issue preclusion from municipal conviction | Conviction should not bar federal ADA/FHAA claims because criminal proceedings lacked civil discovery and remedies | City: municipal conviction and prior administrative rulings preclude relitigation | Reversed: municipal criminal conviction not preclusive here due to qualitative differences in fact-finding, remedies, and incentives; administrative ruling also not preclusive because different horse/location and fact-specific inquiry required |
| ADA — Reasonable modification to allow miniature horse | Ellie is individually trained to assist C.A.; ADA regs permit miniature horses and assessment factors can be satisfied; disputed factual issues exist | City: horse not necessary for daily life, not sufficiently trained, yard too small, not housebroken, health/sanitation concerns | Reversed: genuine disputes of material fact on training, assessment factors, and reasonableness preclude summary judgment for City |
| ADA — Intentional discrimination (Title II) | City acted because of C.A.'s disability when enacting/enforcing the ordinance | City acted in response to legitimate citizen sanitation complaints, not disability animus | Affirmed: record shows citizen complaints motivated action; no evidence City acted because of C.A.'s disability |
| FHAA — Reasonable accommodation, disparate treatment, disparate impact | FHAA requires accommodation for equal enjoyment of dwelling; ordinance and enforcement denied equal use; disparate-impact on disabled who need miniature horses | City: alternative therapy available off-site; ordinance exempts federally protected animals; action motivated by sanitation/property concerns | Mixed: Reversed on reasonable-accommodation (fact disputes on necessity and reasonableness); Affirmed on disparate treatment (no intent) and disparate impact (ordinance exempts federally protected animals, so no disparate impact) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008) (intentional-discrimination standard under Title II; must show action "because of" disability)
- Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2005) (city action in response to citizen complaints is not necessarily discrimination because of disability)
- Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n, 760 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2014) (FHAA requires highly fact-specific inquiry on reasonable accommodation)
- Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2002) (municipalities owe duty to afford reasonable accommodations in zoning practices)
- Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996) (FHAA claims: disparate treatment, disparate impact, failure to accommodate framework)
- Walden v. Ohio, 547 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 1989) (criminal acquittal need not preclude later civil relitigation due to qualitative differences between criminal and civil proceedings)
- Szefcyk v. Ohio, 671 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio 1996) (criminal conviction can preclude later civil challenges when issue was fully litigated in criminal proceeding)
- Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasonableness of accommodations is a highly fact-specific inquiry)
- Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejected a sole-causation standard for ADA intent claims)