Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mine Safety & Health Administration
792 F.3d 1252
10th Cir.2015Background
- Andalex Resources petitions for review MSHA’s revocation of six granted modifications to safety standards for two Utah underground mines.
- Modifications previously allowed alternatives to mandatory rules on sprinklers, belt air ventilation, atmospheric monitoring, diesel equipment, electric near faces, and other electronic testing gear.
- Andalex ceased mining in 2008, sealed Pinnacle and Aberdeen mines, and submitted updated maps per sealing regulations.
- MSHA proposed revocation after sealing, treating it as a change in circumstances under 30 C.F.R. § 44.52(c).
- ALJ upheld revocation citing changed circumstances and concerns about long inactivity and uninspected equipment, relying on a handbook of revocation reasons.
- Assistant Secretary affirmed, concluding prolonged inactivity and inability to maintain equipment constituted changed circumstances warranting revocation; petition for review followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did MSHA abuse discretion under 44.52(c)? | Andalex argues revocation rests on speculation and no change in circumstances. | MSHA contends sealing and inactivity constitute a change in circumstances justifying revocation. | No abuse; change in circumstances supported revocation. |
| Was there substantial evidence of changed circumstances? | MSHA relied on conjecture rather than facts. | Sealing and long inactivity plus equipment maintenance inability prove change. | Substantial evidence supports revocation. |
| May MSHA rely on its handbook factors with deference? | Agency handbook factors are not controlling or fully reasoned. | MSHA’s use of handbook factors deserves great deference as interpretations of its regulations. | MSHA’s use is entitled to great deference; not arbitrary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994) (need for a rational connection in arbitrary-and-capricious review)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (U.S. 1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard requires reasoned decision)
- Foust v. Lujan, 942 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1991) (substantial evidence standard definition)
- Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2007) (deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
- Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (U.S. 1994) (agency interpretation of regulation; defer unless plain language compels)