and 18SC35, People v. Iannicelli, and People v. Brandt, 2019 CO 80

Iannicelli and Brandt stood on the plaza adjacent to the Lindsey‑Flanigan Courthouse, asked people entering whether they were jurors or reporting for jury duty, and handed out pamphlets promoting jury nullification.
A deputy DA reported them; police arrested the men and the People charged them with multiple counts of jury tampering under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18‑8‑609(1).
The district court dismissed the charges as unconstitutional as applied; a division of the court of appeals affirmed the dismissals on statutory‑interpretation grounds without addressing the First Amendment issue.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether (1) the statutory term “juror” includes summoned prospective jurors and (2) the phrase “a case” in § 18‑8‑609(1) requires intent to influence a juror in a specifically identifiable case.
The Supreme Court held that “juror” adopts the statutory definition in § 18‑8‑601(1) (including summoned prospective jurors), but that § 18‑8‑609(1) prohibits attempts to influence a juror only with respect to a specifically identifiable case; because the charges did not allege intent to influence a juror in a specific case, the dismissals were affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Iannicelli/Brandt)	Held
Scope of “juror” in § 18‑8‑609(1)	Statutory definition in § 18‑8‑601(1) governs; “juror” includes summoned prospective jurors	Argue statute should not reach prospective jurors in the jury‑tampering context	Court: § 18‑8‑601(1) definition applies; “juror” includes summoned prospective jurors
Meaning of “a case” in § 18‑8‑609(1)	No requirement to identify a particular case; intent to influence any extant/scheduled case suffices	Statute must be limited to attempts to influence jurors in a specific, identifiable case to avoid substantial First Amendment overbreadth	Court: “a case” and later “the case” show the statute targets attempts to influence a juror’s vote/opinion/decision in a specifically identifiable case
Constitutionality / overbreadth	Statute is a permissible safeguard on the administration of justice	Statute is overbroad as applied to distribution of jury‑nullification literature on public forum	Court: avoided facial constitutional ruling by adopting limiting construction; on these facts statute does not reach defendants’ generalized nullification advocacy, so dismissal stood

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (public‑issue speech receives robust First Amendment protection)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (leafletting and similar advocacy entitled to strong protection)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (political advocacy via leaflets is core protected speech)
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (state may adopt safeguards to protect administration of justice from outside influence)
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (forum analysis; government may restrict access to certain government properties)
Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997) (construed similar jury‑tampering statute as targeting communications intended to affect a specific proceeding)
People v. Enlow, 310 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1957) (use of definite article refers to a specific state case context)
People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1994) (canon requiring constitutional construction when statutes allow alternate interpretations)
Doubleday v. People, 364 P.3d 193 (Colo. 2016) (statutory‑interpretation rules applied by Colorado Supreme Court)