119 F.4th 1001
D.C. Cir.2024Background
- Statute at issue: 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) makes it a crime to “knowingly enter or remain” in any “restricted building or grounds,” where that defined term includes areas that are “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted” because a Secret Service protectee "is or will be temporarily visiting."
- On Jan. 6, 2021, Couy Griffin scaled barriers onto the U.S. Capitol west lawn and remained on the inaugural stage during the riot; temporary fencing and “Area Closed” signs had been deployed but were trampled by earlier rioters.
- Griffin was tried in a bench trial, convicted under § 1752(a)(1), sentenced to 14 days’ incarceration plus one year supervised release, and appealed.
- Griffin’s primary appellate arguments: (1) the Capitol grounds were no longer “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted” once rioters had torn down fencing and signs, and (2) the statute’s “knowingly” element requires proof that he knew the reason the area was restricted (i.e., that Vice President Pence, a Secret Service protectee, was or would be visiting).
- The D.C. Circuit majority held the grounds remained a § 1752 restricted area and that the government needed to prove only that Griffin knowingly entered/remained in a restricted area (not that he knew a protectee was present). Judge Katsas dissented, arguing the statutory “knowingly” extends to the protectee-presence element and would vacate for lack of a finding on that point.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were the Capitol grounds on Jan. 6 “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted” under § 1752(c)(1) when Griffin entered? | Government: Yes — temporary bike racks, snow-fencing, signs, law-enforcement presence, and Secret Service/Capitol Police perimeter sufficed. | Griffin: No — earlier rioters had trampled/destroyed fencing and signs so the area was no longer restricted. | Held: Yes. Despite trampled barriers, the multi-layered perimeter, signage, and active law-enforcement efforts meant the grounds remained “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted.” |
| Does the statutory “knowingly” in § 1752(a)(1) require proof that the defendant knew the reason the area was restricted (i.e., that a Secret Service protectee was or would be visiting)? | Government: No — “knowingly” requires only awareness that the defendant entered/remained in a restricted area without lawful authority; the protectee-presence element is jurisdictional and need not be in the defendant’s mind. | Griffin: Yes — the defined term “restricted building or grounds” is incorporated into the crime, so the introductory mens rea should extend to all elements of that defined term, including protectee presence. | Held: The majority rejected Griffin’s reading; “knowingly” need not extend to proof that the defendant knew a Secret Service protectee was present or would be visiting. |
| Was there sufficient evidence Griffin knew the area was restricted? | Government: Yes — videos and Griffin’s own post-event statements, plus his conduct and the visible remains of fencing and law enforcement, supported knowledge. | Griffin: No — claimed belief that trampled fencing meant the area was open. | Held: Sufficient evidence supported the factfinder’s conclusion that Griffin knowingly entered/remained without lawful authority. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (jurisdictional elements need not be in the actor’s mind; federal nexus may be "jurisdictional only").
- Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) (presumption that mens rea applies to elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct; inquiry into congressional intent).
- United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (when a modifier introduces a long statutory phrase grammatical limits may prevent it from extending to remote elements).
- McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015) (mens rea can extend to defined statutory terms; ordinary grammar can require knowledge of the object).
- Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (ordinary English supports reading an introductory "knowingly" to apply to limiting phrases that identify the object).
- Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452 (2016) (courts presume Congress intended jurisdictional elements to lie outside express mens rea unless Congress says otherwise).
- United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (mens rea not required for firearm-feature element that increases penalty; severity alone does not attach knowledge to every aggravating fact).
- Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (where text is ambiguous courts rely on mens rea presumption and other canons to determine scope).
- United States v. Lucero, 989 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2021) (in a nested statutory definition, courts required knowledge of substantive definitional elements but excused purely jurisdictional elements).