Amy Weber v. Frances McGrogan
939 F.3d 232
| 3rd Cir. | 2019Background
- In 2014 Amy Weber (pro se) sued nearly sixty defendants in D.N.J., relating to state-court child custody disputes.
- On June 9, 2016 the district court dismissed Weber’s federal complaint without prejudice and gave her 30 days to amend.
- Weber filed a first notice of appeal, was warned by the Circuit Clerk that a dismissal without prejudice may be non-appealable, and then moved to withdraw that appeal (which this Court granted).
- After defendants asked the district court to enter dismissal with prejudice, the docket showed a November 30, 2016 “Civil Case Terminated” utility entry referencing the June 9 order; no signed, separate final order was entered.
- Weber filed a second notice of appeal on December 15, 2016. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding there was no final, appealable order: the docket utility entry is not an order, Weber did not clearly and unequivocally “stand on the complaint,” and Rule 58 required a separate final-document entry to start the appeal clock.
- The court left Weber’s case pending in district court and declined to create or expand exceptions to § 1291 finality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is properly before the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final-order requirement). | Weber contends the appeal is timely from either the Nov. 30 docket termination or the June 9 dismissal (which she says "matured" after 30 days). | Defendants argue no final, signed dismissal with prejudice was entered; the case remains non-final and not appealable. | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: no final order under § 1291. |
| Whether the November 30, 2016 docket entry (“Civil Case Terminated”) constitutes a final, appealable order. | Weber urges the docket termination is effectively a final order because it referenced the June 9 dismissal. | Defendants say the entry is a utility event, not a judge-signed text order, and cannot support appeal. | Utility events are not judicial orders (citing Witasick); the docket entry is not appealable. |
| Whether the June 9 dismissal without prejudice became final by Weber’s conduct (the "stand on the complaint" doctrine). | Weber argues she elected to pursue appeal rather than amend, so the non-final dismissal ripened into finality. | Defendants assert Weber never made a clear, unequivocal election and the district court never entered a self-executing dismissal. | The Court: ‘‘stand on the complaint’’ not satisfied — Weber’s actions were ambiguous and no self-executing order existed. |
| Whether Rule 58 and Rule of Appellate Procedure timing permit treating the June 9 order + 30-day amendment period as triggering the appeal clock. | Weber contends the 30-day amendment period let the June 9 order "mature" into finality and Rule 58(c)(2)(B)’s 150-day fallback supports timeliness. | Defendants argue Rule 58 requires a separate document entry to start the appeal period; absent that, the clock never ran from the June date. | The Court: Rule 58 requires an entry in the civil docket to start the 150-day fallback; there was no such separate final judgment entry, so the appeal is untimely. |
Key Cases Cited
- Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissal without prejudice is not final unless plaintiff cannot amend or elects to stand on complaint)
- Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing text orders, utility events, and minute entries; utility events are not appealable orders)
- Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing district-court intent and plaintiff’s clear election can justify appellate jurisdiction despite absence of explicit final order)
- Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1992) (inaction within the amendment period can be treated as election to stand on complaint for appealability)
- In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996) (clear notice of intent to stand on complaint can render dismissal final and appealable)
- Berke v. Bloch, 242 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (self-executing orders that specify ripening of dismissal can make a non-final dismissal final after the stated date)
- Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (U.S. 2009) (emphasizing the importance of the final-judgment rule and delaying appeals until final judgment)
- Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (U.S. 2017) (refusing to erode § 1291 finality; courts should not expand appeals of right that undermine finality)