Amy E. (Boddy) Dickens v. William John Boddy
119 A.3d 722
| Me. | 2015Background
- William Boddy and Amy Dickens divorced in 2010; Dickens was awarded primary residence and Boddy ordered to pay child support and a parenting coordinator was appointed.
- In 2013 the court modified support and contact: Dickens remained primary resident; Boddy received increased summer contact (about 11 weeks equal time) and a downward deviation in support recognizing that summer sharing; Boddy was unemployed then.
- Boddy moved again in 2014 after becoming employed, asserting (1) his income rose >20%, (2) he had been providing "substantially equal care" for the past year, and (3) the child had started school; he asked the court to (a) reduce support to reflect substantially equal care and (b) change primary residence to shared.
- At the September 2014 hearing the court found both incomes, that the guideline support changed >15%, and granted a downward modification of support based on income change but declined to find substantially equal care or modify primary residence; Boddy’s weekly obligation was set below guideline (a 24% deviation) consistent with prior formula.
- The court concluded Boddy did not meet his burden to prove substantially equal care despite his involvement (attendance at events, coaching), and the fact the child started school or the parenting coordinator role ended did not constitute a substantial change to alter residence; Boddy appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dickens) | Defendant's Argument (Boddy) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boddy provided "substantially equal care" under 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1) so as to require a different child support calculation | Dickens argued the parties do not provide substantially equal care; Dickens remains primary caregiver most of the year | Boddy argued his parenting time (including school and community involvement plus summer equal time) amounts to substantially equal care and warrants downward deviation | Court held Boddy failed to meet burden; evidence did not compel contrary finding — parties are not providing substantially equal care |
| Whether change in incomes and other events required modification of child support | Dickens argued guideline recalculation was appropriate but no further downward deviation based on equal care | Boddy argued income increase and his involvement justified further reduction | Court found >15% guideline variation due to income change warranted modifying support; adjusted support downward but denied further deviation for substantially equal care |
| Whether there was a substantial change in circumstances to modify primary residence | Dickens argued prior order contemplated school and schedule; no substantial change to warrant altering residency | Boddy argued income, termination of parenting coordinator, and child starting school supported modifying residence to shared | Court held Boddy did not show a sufficient change; denied modification of residence |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by excluding certain evidence | Dickens argued exclusion proper; no abuse | Boddy contended excluded evidence should have been admitted | Appellate court found no abuse of discretion in exclusion; Boddy failed to meet burden on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Akers v. Akers, 44 A.3d 311 (Me. 2012) (standards for review of modification of custody/support)
- Pratt v. Sidney, 967 A.2d 685 (Me. 2009) (party asserting substantially equal care bears burden of proof)
- St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 55 A.3d 443 (Me. 2012) (standard for sufficiency challenge when party bears burden)
- Jabar v. Jabar, 899 A.2d 796 (Me. 2006) (support for factual findings on child-care allocation)
- Smith v. Padolko, 955 A.2d 740 (Me. 2008) (15% guideline variation constitutes substantial change)