Ammons v. Washington Department of Social & Health Services
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17023
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- CSTC is a state-run residential psychiatric facility for emotionally/behaviorally disturbed youths; Ammons, a 13-year-old inpatient, sues under §1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to safe conditions.
- LaFond was CSTC's CEO (1995–Mar 2003); Webster was CSTC's Director of Nursing (2001–Apr 2003) and then CSTC's CEO in Apr 2003.
- In 2000–2001, CSTC staff investigated allegations that Anthony Grant sexually molested a female patient; CPS found the allegations unfounded and closed the investigation.
- In Oct 2001 Ammons admitted to CSTC; concerns about Grant’s interactions with Ammons and other female patients persisted; Ammons was discharged in Apr 2003 after prolonged exposure to Grant.
- Ammons later disclosed a sexual relationship between Grant and Ammons beginning in Jan 2003; Grant was terminated after CSTC investigated and concluded misconduct.
- The district court denied summary judgment to both LaFond and Webster; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part (LaFond) and reversed in part (Webster), remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the denial of qualified immunity on LaFond is appealable and proper. | Ammons argues LaFond violated due process by failing to exercise professional judgment. | LaFond argues no clearly established right was violated and actions were within professional judgment. | Yes; the denial is appealable, and LaFond could be liable under Youngberg standard. |
| Whether Ammons's Fourteenth Amendment right to safe conditions was clearly established at the time. | Ammons contends the right was clearly established by Youngberg/Neely. | Defendants argue the standard is not clearly established for these facts. | Yes; the right to safe conditions in involuntary confinement was clearly established. |
| Whether LaFond's conduct constituted a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment. | LaFond's knowledge of prior allegations and signs warranted closer monitoring. | LaFond acted within presumed professional judgment and state-law constraints. | Ammons could show a substantial departure; LaFond not entitled to immunity. |
| Whether Webster acted with qualified immunity given his limited role and knowledge. | Ammons argues Webster knew or should have known risk to Ammons. | Webster lacked sufficient time and information to act; no substantial departure. | Webster entitled to qualified immunity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1982) (right to safe conditions; professional judgment standard)
- Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (conscious indifference vs. professional judgment applied to safety of patients)
- Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O'Connor, 846 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (conscious indifference standard cited in Youngberg context)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (appealability of orders denying qualified immunity on legal issues)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (two-prong test for qualified immunity; court can address either prong first)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (S. Ct. 2009) (supervisory liability requires personal participation; no vicarious liability)