Ammar Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chemical Company
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4603
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Ammar Alkhawaldeh, a Muslim Jordanian Arab, was hired by Dow Chemical in 2008 as a Functional Scientist/Functional Leader in Epoxy R&D; his supervisor was Dr. Bruce Hook.
- Hook rated Ammar a "1" (lowest) in October 2009 and placed him on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP); Ammar filed EEOC charges alleging discrimination and retaliation beginning April 2010 (controlling charge filed November 17, 2010).
- Ammar complained in November 2009 about racially/ethnically offensive remarks by coworkers and reported them to HR and Hook; he alleges Hook retaliated, gave the low rating, and blocked transfers.
- Dow transferred Ammar in July 2010 to another supervisor (David West); Dow and a corporate committee later concluded his performance remained deficient despite PIP activity.
- Dow terminated Ammar on October 30, 2010; Ammar sued under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Dow; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ammar made a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII | Ammar says he was treated worse (rated 1, placed on PIP, then fired) because of his protected characteristics | Dow says Ammar identified no similarly situated non‑protected comparator and admitted he was unique in receiving a 1 and being placed on a PIP | Held for Dow: Ammar failed to identify a proper comparator; discrimination claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether Ammar established a prima facie case of retaliation | Ammar contends his complaints about offensive remarks were protected activity and led to adverse actions (PIP, denial of transfer, termination) | Dow argues the termination was for poor performance and not causally connected to protected complaints; temporal gap undermines causation | Held for Dow: Even assuming protected activity, the record cannot show the termination was caused "but for" that activity |
| Whether inconsistent explanations or evidence created genuine issue of pretext | Ammar points to evidence that he completed the PIP and testimony allegedly inconsistent with Dow’s stated reason for firing him | Dow points to post‑transfer evaluations, committee findings, and multiple indicia of poor performance supporting termination | Held for Dow: Inconsistencies do not create a reasonable inference that the firing was due to retaliation; West’s and the committee’s negative evaluations independently justify termination |
| Whether summary judgment standard was satisfied | Ammar argues factual disputes (PIP completion, motives) preclude summary judgment | Dow asserts absence of evidentiary support for discrimination/retaliation and legitimate non‑discriminatory reasons for termination | Held for Dow: Viewing facts in light most favorable to Ammar, no reasonable juror could find but‑for causation or disparate treatment; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial Title VII cases)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Price v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715 (distinguishing EEOC investigative reports from nonbinding EEOC letters)
- Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253 (requires nearly identical circumstances for comparator analysis)
- Feist v. La. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450 (discusses burden shifting and pretext in retaliation context)
- Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d 589 (inconsistent employer explanations may support an inference of pretext)