Aminata Dieng v. William Barr, 947 F.3d 956

Background

Petitioners Aminata Dieng and Ousseynou Ndiaye Lo are Senegalese nationals; Dieng sought asylum in 2007 alleging past persecution (attempts to subject her to FGM) and fear for her U.S.-born daughters.
An IJ and the BIA found Dieng credible and that she suffered past persecution but denied asylum because she testified she no longer feared FGM personally and could internally relocate within Senegal (husband is Wolof, a group not typically practicing FGM).
The BIA dismissed their appeal in 2010; DHS began enforcing that order in 2018, prompting petitioners to file a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions (renewed family threats and reports showing ongoing FGM practice).
Petitioners submitted affidavits and family letters alleging renewed threats and included a 2015 charitable report and the 2016 State Department report on FGM in Senegal.
The BIA denied the motion as untimely under the 90‑day rule and, on the merits of the changed‑conditions exception, found the proffered evidence not persuasive, speculative, from interested witnesses, not based on personal knowledge, and insufficient to overcome its prior internal‑relocation finding.
The Sixth Circuit majority denied review, holding the BIA did not abuse its discretion; Judge White dissented, arguing the BIA failed to accept reasonably specific facts or adequately explain its credibility findings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the changed‑country‑conditions exception excuses the 90‑day filing rule	New affidavits and family letters show relatives renewed threats and FGM remains practiced, so evidence is new and material	Evidence is not previously unavailable, not corroborated, speculative, and therefore does not satisfy the exception	BIA: exception not met; Sixth Circuit: no abuse of discretion in denying reopening
Whether BIA must accept reasonably specific facts in affidavits unless inherently unbelievable	Trujillo Diaz: BIA must accept reasonably specific facts unless it explicitly finds them inherently unbelievable	BIA gave reasons (self‑serving, speculative, interested witnesses, lack of personal knowledge) showing unbelievability; not required to use magic words	Court: BIA’s credibility rationale sufficed; no abuse of discretion
Whether new evidence would overcome prior conclusion that internal relocation is reasonable	New letters show family actively seeking them and reports show continued FGM and lack of enforcement, so relocation is not safe	New evidence does not rebut prior factual basis that relocation to a Wolof area would avoid FGM or show government powerless	BIA and Sixth Circuit: evidence insufficient to overcome prior internal‑relocation finding
Proper standard and analogy for motions to reopen (summary judgment v. Rule 60/new trial)	Motion‑to‑reopen review should accept movant’s reasonably specific facts (summary‑judgment analogy)	Supreme Court treats motions to reopen like Rule 60/new‑trial — movant bears a heavy burden; BIA has broad discretion	Court: Abudu/Doherty controlling; BIA discretion appropriate; even under alternate analogy, BIA’s findings were adequate

Key Cases Cited

Zhang v. Mukaskey, 543 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2008) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of BIA denial of motion to reopen)
Precetaj v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2018) (BIA must articulate basis enabling meaningful appellate review)
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (motions to reopen carry a heavy burden and BIA has broad discretion)
INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) (BIA may deny reopening on multiple independent grounds)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (Supreme Court analogies to Rule 60/new‑trial in motion‑to‑reopen context)
Trujillo Diaz v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2018) (BIA should accept reasonably specific facts unless inherently unbelievable)
Yu Yun Zhang v. Holder, 702 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2012) (BIA has broad discretion to weigh credibility on motions to reopen)
Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009) (material changed country evidence compared to record at merits hearing)
Yousif v. INS, 794 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986) (motion to reopen requires prima facie showing of statutory eligibility)
Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion standards for BIA decisions)
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004) (cannot rely on speculative assertions to show persecution)
Abdelghani v. Holder, [citation="567 F. App'x 388"] (6th Cir. 2014) (affidavits from interested relatives may be given less weight)