AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC
593 U.S. 67
SCOTUS2021Background
- Scott Tucker and his online payday‑lending companies made millions of loans with misleading disclosures; consumers were charged deceptive, automatic‑renewal fees totaling over $1.3 billion.
- The FTC sued Tucker in federal district court under §13(b) of the FTC Act seeking a permanent injunction and equitable monetary relief (restitution and disgorgement).
- The district court granted summary judgment, issued an injunction, and ordered $1.27 billion in monetary relief to be used for consumer redress and disgorgement to the Treasury.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on precedent that §13(b)’s injunction language permits ancillary equitable monetary relief.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether §13(b) authorizes courts to award equitable monetary relief directly, bypassing the Act’s administrative process (§5) and the redress scheme (§19).
- The Court held that §13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief and reversed the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (FTC) | Defendant's Argument (Tucker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §13(b)’s authorization to seek a “permanent injunction” allows courts to award equitable monetary relief (restitution/disgorgement) | “Permanent injunction” includes traditional equitable powers; courts historically award monetary relief incident to injunctions. | §13(b) speaks only to injunctions and does not authorize retrospective monetary relief. | No. §13(b) authorizes injunctive (prospective) relief only; it does not authorize equitable monetary awards. |
| Relevance of Porter and Mitchell (equity cases allowing monetary relief alongside injunctions) | Those precedents establish that injunction authority carries restorative equitable powers. | Porter/Mitchell are not universal rules; one must read the statute’s text and scheme. | Porter/Mitchell do not control; statutory structure can limit equitable jurisdiction. |
| Whether §5 and §19 (administrative process and consumer‑redress provisions) imply §13(b) already permits monetary relief | §13(b) is a parallel enforcement path; §19 merely overlaps. | §5/§19 explicitly provide conditioned monetary remedies; Congress would not duplicate unrestricted monetary authority in §13(b). | The existence and limits of §5/§19 imply §13(b) was not meant to bypass them for monetary relief. |
| Significance of judicial precedent and congressional inaction (acquiescence) | Longstanding circuit consensus and later amendments show Congress accepted the courts’ reading. | Subsequent amendments did not address §13(b)’s remedial text; isolated amendments do not prove acquiescence. | Congressional inaction on isolated amendments does not demonstrate approval; acquiescence argument fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (equitable restitution sometimes incident to injunctions)
- Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (equity courts may grant complete relief in statutory schemes unless statute indicates otherwise)
- Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (scope of equitable relief is a question of statutory interpretation)
- Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (statutory enforcement scheme can preclude equitable monetary awards despite injunction language)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (Congress does not hide sweeping authority in ambiguous text)
- FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. precedent construing §13(b) to allow ancillary monetary relief)
- FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. decision rejecting broad §13(b) monetary relief)
- FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. decision limiting §13(b) remedial scope)