American Optical Corp. v. Spiewak
73 So. 3d 120
| Fla. | 2011Background
- The Florida Supreme Court reviews the Fourth District’s ruling that the Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act (the Act) is unconstitutional as applied to claimants with accrued actions.
- The Act, enacted in 2005, requires proof of existing physical impairment or malignancy caused by asbestos as an essential element for an asbestos claim.
- Prior to the Act, Florida common law allowed claims for asbestos-related injury based on injury from exposure, even without impairment or cancer.
- The Fourth District held that the Act cannot be retroactively applied to vested rights of suits pending when the Act took effect in 2005.
- The majority affirms the Fourth District, disapproving DaimlerChrysler v. Hurst to the extent inconsistent, and finds retroactive application unconstitutional under due process.
- The dissent argues there was no settled right to recover for asbestos exposure absent impairment, and would reverse the majority’s invalidation of the Act as applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Appellees have vested rights in accrued asbestos actions prior to the Act | Appellees possessed vested rights under prior law. | Right to sue accrues only upon impairment; Act did not retroactively destroy vested rights. | Yes; Appellees have vested rights. |
| Whether retroactive application of the Act violates due process | Retroactivity protects vested rights but can be consistent if impairment is present. | Act is remedial and retroactive application is permissible. | Retroactive application violates due process. |
| Whether the Act can be applied to claimants with accrued actions pending on its effective date | Act preserves and advances rights; should apply to pending suits. | Act impairs vested rights and should not apply to accrued actions. | Cannot be applied to accrued actions pending on effective date. |
| Whether the Act’s impairment requirements (specific physical impairment) are consistent with Florida common law | Common law allowed injury from exposure without specific impairment thresholds. | Act introduces impairment-based requirements as a threshold. | Impairment threshold is unconstitutional as applied to vested rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985) (discusses accrual based on manifestation in asbestos injuries)
- Meehan, 523 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1988) (diagnosis of asbestos-related disease triggers accrual)
- Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1994) (property interest upon accrual and due process considerations)
- Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1982) (cause of action as property interest protected by Due Process)
- McCord v. Smith, 43 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1949) (vested rights; retroactivity concerns in accumulation of rights)
- Metro-Dade County v. Chase Fed. Housing Corp., 737 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1999) (retroactivity analysis framework for statutes)
- Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So.3d 873 (Fla. 2010) (two-part retroactivity test)