American Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC
2011 WL 2506043
| D.C. Cir. | 2011Background
- Bondholders of Washington Mutual Bank sue JPMorgan Chase in Texas state court for tortious interference, breach of confidentiality, and unjust enrichment; FDIC intervenes and removes to federal court.
- Plaintiffs amend and some claims related to WMB bonds are dismissed; remaining claims concern WMB assets and JPMorgan's alleged scheme.
- FDIC as receiver moves to dismiss under FIRREA; district court holds § 1821(d)(13)(D) jurisdictional bar applies and dismisses.
- On appeal, the DC Circuit considers whether FIRREA's administrative-exhaustion bar applies to a suit against a third party (JPMC) for its own alleged wrongdoing.
- Court analyzes whether actions at issue are 'claims' under FIRREA and whether § 1821(d)(13)(D) withdraws jurisdiction, ultimately remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1821(d)(13)(D) bars the suit. | JPMorgan seeks to bar as to acts by FDIC/WaMu assets. | Suit relates to the FDIC as receiver and the assets; must be barred. | Not barred |
| Whether the suit is a 'claim' under FIRREA. | Suit constitutes a FIRREA claim against the depository institution. | Suit is against a third party for its own wrongdoing, not a FIRREA claim. | Not a FIRREA claim |
| Whether FIRREA's exhaustion requirement applies when the suit does not involve the depository institution or the FDIC as receiver paying rights. | Exhaustion should not be required for non-claims. | Exhaustion applies broadly to claims against depository institutions or their assets. | Exhaustion does not apply here; claims not against the institution are not within the administrative process |
| Whether Village of Oakwood controls this case to bar the suit. | Oakwood supports broader bar of such suits. | Oakwood is distinguishable; here JPMorgan alone is alleged to have acted, not the FDIC as receiver. | Distinguishable; Oakwood not controlling |
| Whether the court should remand on standing/ownership questions. | FDIC ownership of claims may bar suit. | Ownership questions are complex and should be addressed by the district court. | Remand for district court to address standing and ownership questions |
Key Cases Cited
- Auction Co. of Am. v. FDIC, 141 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (limits breadth of FIRREA exhaustion; claims must be resolvable within claims process)
- Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (FIRREA § 1821(d)(13)(D) acts as jurisdictional bar absent exhaustion)
- Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991) (claims against assuming bank for its own acts not within § 1821(d)(13)(D))
- Village of Oakwood v. State Bank & Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes claims against third party from FDIC as receiver)
- O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1994) (FDIC steps into shoes of failed bank; implications for 'claims')
- Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 1994) (interpretation of FIRREA claims framework)
- OPEIU, Local 2 v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (broadly construed 'claim against a depository institution' language)
- Freeman v. FDIC (duplicate entry to emphasize relevance), 56 F.3d 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (See Freeman for exhaustion framework)