American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, District Council 20, Local 2087 v. University of the District of Columbia
166 A.3d 967
| D.C. | 2017Background
- AFSCME filed grievances for two UDC Career Service employees who were terminated for alleged misuse of funds; arbitrator Michael Wolf partially reinstated them, finding 30-day suspensions appropriate.
- In a supplemental award Wolf ordered UDC to reimburse AFSCME for reasonable attorney’s fees, reasoning the Back Pay Act (BPA) applied even though the CBA is silent on attorney’s fees.
- PERB affirmed the award, concluding an arbitrator may exercise equitable powers to award fees when the CBA does not expressly restrict that authority and that Wolf’s application of BPA was permissible given UDC had not adopted a comprehensive personnel/compensation system.
- UDC sought judicial review in Superior Court; Judge Epstein vacated and remanded, holding the arbitrator failed to identify whether the award rested on the CBA or on the BPA/equitable powers and thus may have exceeded his authority.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed PERB de novo on legal questions and reversed the Superior Court, reinstating PERB’s affirmation: the arbitrator did not exceed authority and the award did not contravene public policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (AFSCME) | Defendant's Argument (UDC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding attorney’s fees when CBA is silent | Arbitrator could award fees under equitable powers and BPA applicability; CBA did not expressly restrict such relief | Arbitrator lacked contractual basis; awarding fees under BPA contradicts CBA silence and exceeded jurisdiction | Held: No — arbitrator did not exceed authority; PERB properly deferred to arbitrator’s equitable power absent express CBA restriction |
| Whether award contravened law/public policy by applying BPA to UDC employees | BPA applies to UDC Career Service employees because UDC had not implemented a comprehensive substitute compensation system | UDC argued it had established its own system (DPM/WPD) and BPA was superseded for its employees | Held: No clear legal authority shows BPA inapplicable; PERB’s and arbitrator’s application of BPA not contrary to law or public policy |
| Whether PERB/superior court required remand for arbitrator to state grounds | AFSCME: arbitrators need not state grounds; award valid if within equitable powers or contract interpretation | UDC/Superior Ct.: ambiguity whether award derived from CBA or BPA warranted remand | Held: No remand required; arbitrators need not explain grounds and PERB correctly decided authority issue as matter of law |
| Standard of review for arbitrability and PERB decision | AFSCME: PERB’s legal conclusions entitled to review but decision stands if supported by substantial evidence | UDC: sought deference to Superior Court remand | Held: Court reviews PERB’s legal conclusions (de novo on arbitrability); nevertheless PERB’s conclusion that arbitrator acted within authority is not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 942 A.2d 1108 (D.C. 2007) (BPA continues to apply to District employees under CMPA unless a new comprehensive system replaces it)
- White v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 962 A.2d 258 (D.C. 2008) (entities that adopt a comprehensive personnel/compensation system may be exempt from BPA/counsel-fee provisions)
- Fraternal Order of Police/Dep’t of Corrections Labor Comm. v. District of Columbia Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., 973 A.2d 174 (D.C. 2009) (PERB decisions must stand unless "rationally indefensible")
- District of Columbia Pub. Emp. Relations Bd. v. Fraternal Order of Police/Metro. Police Dep’t Labor Comm., 987 A.2d 1205 (D.C. 2010) (limits on PERB review of arbitration awards; grounds to modify/set aside award listed)
- Sindler v. Batleman, 416 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1980) (arbitrator is confined to interpretation/application of the collective bargaining agreement and award must draw its essence from the CBA)
- United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (classic articulation that arbitral authority derives from the contract)
- Schwartz v. Chow, 867 A.2d 230 (D.C. 2005) (arbitrators are not required to state the grounds for their decisions)
- Cathedral Ave. Co-op., Inc. v. Carter, 947 A.2d 1143 (D.C. 2008) (affirming that arbitrators commonly do not offer reasons for decisions)