American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees, Council 75, Local 2043 v. City of Lebanon, 208 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3246

Background

City of Lebanon councilor Margaret Campbell wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing unions and urging city employees to decertify their union; she prefaced the letter by saying she wrote as an individual, not for the city.
AFSCME Council 75 filed an unfair labor practice complaint; the Employment Relations Board (ERB) held the city liable under ORS 243.672(1) for Campbell’s statements and ordered remedial relief.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Campbell was neither the city’s "designated representative" nor acting as a "public employer" for PECBA liability.
The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Campbell’s conduct could be imputed to the city as a "public employer or its designated representative" under PECBA.
The Supreme Court adopted a "reasonable belief" standard (drawing on NLRA precedent) for when an individual qualifies as a public employer representative and remanded to ERB to apply that standard to the facts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Campbell’s statements can be imputed to the city as a "public employer" under ORS 243.672(1)	City council membership makes Campbell part of the public employer and her statements can be the city’s conduct	Individual councilors lack unilateral authority under the charter; only the city (or designated agents) can act as employer	Court did not decide whether "public employer" includes individual agents generally; focused on "designated representative" and applied a reasonable-belief test for imputation
Whether Campbell was a "designated representative" (or "public employer representative") of the city when she wrote the letter	ERB treated any official who could be perceived as speaking for the city as the city’s representative; union urged broad imputation	City argued no specific designation and charter limits individual authority; court of appeals required specific designation	Supreme Court held the statutory term is broad and adopted the NLRA-derived "reasonable belief" standard: impute when employees would reasonably believe the individual acted on behalf of the employer; remanded to ERB to apply factors
Proper interpretive approach: rely on NLRA federal precedent vs. strict textual/agency analysis	Union urged using federal NLRA pre-1973 case law since PECBA was modeled on the NLRA	City/dissent argued PECBA text differs and did not adopt NLRA agency provisions; rely on ordinary statutory/agency rules	Court found PECBA sufficiently parallel to NLRA to adopt federal "reasonable belief" doctrine as persuasive and consistent with PECBA policy of protecting employees’ organizational rights
Standard/factors for imputing individual statements to public employer	ERB had focused on council membership/status as a decision-maker	City argued only specific designation or charter authority should count; dissent urged apparent-authority requiring principal action	Court adopted a multifactor reasonable-belief test (e.g., rank, policy-making authority, hire/fire power, official capacity, employer disavowal) and remanded for ERB factfinding

Key Cases Cited

International Ass'n of Machinists v. Labor Board, 311 U.S. 72 (Supreme Court) (adopted a broad standard for employer responsibility where employees reasonably think agents act for management)
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (Supreme Court) (reinforced that employer liability may not depend on express authorization or ratification under NLRA context)
NLRB v. Geigy Co., 211 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.) (employer responsibility depends on whether employees might reasonably believe the actor was acting for management)
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.) (factors and totality of circumstances test for imputing individual acts to employer)
Morgan Precision Parts v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.) (treating executive/officer statements as attributable to employer)