American Civil Rights Union v. Brenda Snipes
935 F.3d 1192
11th Cir.2019Background
- ACRU sued Broward County Supervisor of Elections Brenda Snipes alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) for failing to conduct reasonable list maintenance of ineligible voters. 1199SEIU intervened to protect voters from improper removals.
- NVRA §8(a)(3) lists permitted removals (registrant request; state-law removals for criminal conviction or mental incapacity; and removals under §8(a)(4)), while §8(a)(4) requires a general program to make a reasonable effort to remove voters who are ineligible because of death or change of residence.
- HAVA requires states to maintain computerized statewide lists and a “system of file maintenance,” but expressly directs that removals from computerized lists follow the NVRA’s provisions and provides only administrative/AG enforcement (no private right of action).
- The NVRA provides an NCOA (Postal Service National Change of Address) safe-harbor procedure (§8(c)/(d)) that a state “may” use to satisfy its change-of-address list-maintenance obligation; the NVRA also prescribes notice and timing procedures before removal.
- After a five-day bench trial the district court found (1) NVRA’s list-maintenance mandate is limited to death and change of address, (2) Snipes reasonably used the NCOA safe harbor and reliable death records (Florida Health Dept. and SSDI) to identify and remove ineligible voters, and (3) ACRU’s statistical evidence of overregistration was unpersuasive. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of NVRA §8(a)(4): whether the general-program requirement extends beyond death and change of residence (e.g., criminal conviction, mental incapacity) | NVRA’s references to removing “ineligible” voters and related provisions demonstrate Congress intended a general-duty to remove all ineligible voters | Text of §8(a)(3)–(4) is unambiguous: §8(a)(3) permits some removals; §8(a)(4) affirmatively requires a program only for death and change of residence | NVRA’s text is plain: the general program requirement covers only removals due to death or change of residence; other bases (criminal conviction, mental incapacity) remain permissive or governed by state law. |
| Effect of HAVA on NVRA obligations | HAVA’s file-maintenance language clarifies/expands NVRA, requiring removal of all ineligible registrants and thus broadening federal obligation | HAVA references NVRA procedures for removals and creates no private cause of action; it does not alter NVRA’s scope | HAVA does not broaden NVRA’s list-maintenance obligations and explicitly requires computerized removals to comply with NVRA (including §8(a)(4)). |
| NCOA safe-harbor: whether following the NCOA process can satisfy NVRA change-of-address duty | NCOA may be one option but standing alone might not meet statutory requirements because it misses movers who don’t notify USPS | Statutory text makes the NCOA process an explicit method by which a State "may meet the requirement" of §8(a)(4); states may adopt more robust methods but are not required to | The NCOA procedure is a statutory safe harbor and, at minimum, constitutes a reasonable effort to identify movers; Snipes’s use of it satisfied the NVRA as a factual matter. |
| Sufficiency of Snipes’s factual compliance (use of NCOA and death records; ACRU’s registration-rate evidence) | ACRU: Broward’s high registration rates and other omissions show inadequate list maintenance; County should have used additional databases | Snipes: used NCOA safe harbor, sent required notices, used Florida death records and SSDI, and maintained ongoing removals; NVRA requires reasonable, not exhaustive, efforts | District court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous: Snipes reasonably used NCOA and reliable death records; ACRU’s expert methodology was discounted and did not refute compliance. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (statutory interpretation begins with text)
- BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (presume legislature means what it says)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (clear-error standard for bench-trial factual findings)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (private rights of action must be created by Congress)
- Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (Supreme Court discussed NCOA as an option; states may adopt supplemental procedures)
- Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. 91 (avoid statutory interpretations that render provisions superfluous)