Amended July 31, 2015 In RE the Marriage of Susan Michelle Thatcher and Ronald Dean Thatcher Upon the Petition of Susan Michelle Thatcher, Anna Carson as for the Estate of Susan Michelle Thatcher
2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 66
| Iowa | 2015Background
- Susan Thatcher (terminally ill) filed for dissolution in Sept. 2013 seeking to die unmarried; husband Ronald resisted.
- Susan moved to bifurcate: obtain a decree dissolving the marriage immediately and defer division of marital property to a later proceeding; supplemented by physicians’ statements that death was imminent.
- District court granted bifurcation and entered a decree dissolving the marriage while reserving property division for later; Susan died the next day.
- Ronald appealed; the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory; Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.
- The Supreme Court held the dissolution decree was a reviewable final judgment but concluded section 598.21(1) requires contemporaneous division of property with the dissolution decree, so bifurcation was prohibited; the decree was reversed and the case remanded for dismissal (the dissolution abated by death).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ronald) | Defendant's Argument (Susan's Estate) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the bifurcated decree reviewable now (final judgment)? | Decree dissolving the marriage is final and appealable. | Property division reserved means decree is interlocutory. | Decree was a reviewable final judgment. |
| Does Iowa Code § 598.21(1) permit bifurcated divorces? | Statute requires contemporaneous property division with dissolution. | Rule allowing separate trials and court discretion permit bifurcation. | § 598.21(1) requires division of property upon judgment of dissolution; bifurcation prohibited. |
| If bifurcation prohibited, what is effect of the wife’s death after decree but before property division? | Death abates dissolution proceedings; property goes to probate. | Bifurcated decree argued to be effective; estate sought dismissal of appeal as premature. | Death abated the dissolution; proceedings dismissed and probate determines property. |
| Should courts adopt bifurcation as inherent authority or policy matter? | (Implicit) statutory text controls; policy changes belong to legislature. | Court has inherent authority to manage proceedings; bifurcation can be justified in some cases. | Court declines to adopt bifurcation on policy/inherent-authority grounds; invites legislature to change law. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1977) (dissolution is equitable; standard of review)
- In re Marriage of Denly, 590 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1999) (definition of final judgment vs. interlocutory order)
- In re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207 (Iowa 1978) (appealability of dissolution orders involving property contingencies)
- In re Marriage of Welp, 596 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1999) (appealability principles for family-law orders)
- In re Estate of Peek, 497 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 1993) (death abates dissolution proceedings)
- Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, 248 N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1976) (final judgment must finally adjudicate parties’ rights)
- Davis v. Davis, 957 A.2d 576 (D.C. 2008) (statute like § 598.21 interpreted to require contemporaneous property division)
- In re Marriage of Cohn, 443 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. 1982) (policy reasons favor contemporaneous resolution; cautions on bifurcation)