278 A.3d 1216
Md.2022Background
- Construction workers on the MGM National Harbor project were directed to park at an off‑site lot (Rosecroft) ~2.3 miles away and ride contractor‑provided buses to the site; they were not paid for waiting, bus rides, or security processing — roughly 1.5–2 hours/day unrecorded and uncompensated.
- Plaintiffs brought class claims under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL), and unjust enrichment for unpaid wages/overtime for wait and travel time between Rosecroft and the worksite.
- Trial courts (Amaya: summary judgment; Rojas: judgment after plaintiffs rested) ruled for employers, applying federal Portal‑to‑Portal Act (PPA)/FLSA principles and finding Rosecroft was not a compensable worksite.
- The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding Maryland law incorporates the FLSA/PPA/CFR and that a worksite requires performance of job duties at the location.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed: it held the PPA has not been adopted or incorporated into Maryland law (MWHL, MWPCL, or COMAR), concluded COMAR 09.12.41.10 controls (hours = time employer requires employee to be on premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace), found genuine factual disputes about whether Rosecroft was employer premises/prescribed workplace or whether employees were on duty, and remanded for factfinding; it also reversed dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim in Rojas insofar as that dismissal rested on applying the PPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Portal‑to‑Portal Act/FLSA compensability rules have been adopted into Maryland law (MWHL, MWPCL, COMAR) | PPA never adopted; Maryland statutes/regulations don’t mention PPA; Maryland law is remedial and protects all hours employer requires employee to be on premises/on duty/prescribed workplace | MWHL mirrors FLSA; by enacting a state analogue the legislature implicitly incorporated FLSA/PPA/CFR; COMAR mirrors federal regs | Rejected incorporation: PPA not adopted. Maryland law’s definition of “work” is not limited by PPA/FLSA. |
| Whether COMAR 09.12.41.10 treats an employer‑directed parking/assembly location (Rosecroft) as a worksite/prescribed workplace (i.e., compensable) | A worksite includes locations where employer exercises control or requires employees to report; Rosecroft was required/approved and enforced by general contractor | A worksite is a place where job duties/principal activities are performed; no work occurred at Rosecroft so it is not compensable | COMAR controls: hours include time employer requires employee to be on premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace. Whether Rosecroft met any of those is a factual question for the trier of fact. |
| Whether summary judgment / judgment as a matter of law was proper on liability | Plaintiffs: factual disputes exist about compulsion, control, and whether Rosecroft was a prescribed workplace or employer premises | Defendants: undisputed evidence showed no work, no sign‑in, no tools or directions at Rosecroft; travel/commute not compensable | Trial courts erred. Material factual disputes exist; summary judgment and directed verdict were improper. Cases remanded for factfinding/jury determination. |
| Whether unjust enrichment claim could be dismissed because travel/wait time was not compensable under PPA | Plaintiffs: unjust enrichment is separate and viable if they were entitled to compensation under Maryland law | Defendants: no compensable benefit was conferred because travel/wait is noncompensable | Court rejected dismissal. Because PPA does not control, unjust enrichment dismissal based on PPA was erroneous; claim must be reconsidered after remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) (Supreme Court’s early definition of “work” under FLSA and holding underground travel in mines constituted compensable work)
- Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944) (on on‑call time on employer premises and whether such time can be compensable)
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (employer‑required time on premises prior to productive work can be compensable)
- Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956) (integral‑and‑indispensable test for preliminary/postliminary activities under PPA/FLSA)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (discussion of continuous workday rule and workday definition under FLSA/PPA framework)
- Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014) (modern restatement of the integral‑and‑indispensable test tying compensability to principal productive work)
- Comptroller of Md. v. Miller, 398 Md. 272 (2007) (Maryland Court of Appeals addressing travel/commute in interpreting state regulations)
- Poe v. IESI MD Corp., 243 Md. App. 243 (2019) (Md. Ct. Spec. App. — federal regulators may be persuasive where state and federal provisions substantially mirror each other)
- Hausfeld v. Love Funding Corp., 131 F. Supp. 3d 443 (D. Md. 2015) (application of Maryland wage statutes to out‑of‑state employer activities)
- Himes Assocs., Ltd. v. Anderson, 178 Md. App. 504 (2008) (Md. Ct. Spec. App. — scope of employer obligations under Maryland wage statutes to out‑of‑state employers)
- In re Amazon.com, Inc., 255 A.3d 191 (Pa. 2021) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to judicially incorporate the federal PPA into the Pennsylvania minimum wage statute)