Amanda Sue Smith v. United States
873 F.3d 1348
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Smith entered a business arrangement: she purchased high-end cars, financed them, and leased them to Mani Chulpayev for use in his rental business; lease payments were to cover her loans and insurance.
- Chulpayev stopped making payments after four months; Smith continued loan payments, later defaulted, and discovered Chulpayev was an FBI confidential informant at the time of the deal.
- After exhausting administrative remedies, Smith sued the United States under the FTCA alleging negligence, deliberate indifference, and conversion, claiming the FBI’s relationship with Chulpayev caused her losses.
- The district court dismissed all three counts for failure to state a claim; Smith appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo, applied Georgia law (where the events occurred), and evaluated whether state-law causes of action existed to support FTCA liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the U.S. owed Smith a duty to control Chulpayev (negligence) | FBI had a close relationship and exercised control over informant, creating a duty to protect third parties | No special relationship or legal/physical custody existed to impose a duty under Georgia law | Dismissed—no duty; no special relationship shown under Georgia law |
| Whether violation of FBI/DOJ internal policies creates negligence liability | Breach of Informant Guidelines/DOJ policies made FBI liable | Violations of federal internal policies do not, by themselves, create state-law torts | Dismissed—internal policy breaches do not establish Georgia tort liability for FTCA purposes |
| Whether a Georgia cause of action exists for “deliberate indifference” | Smith alleged deliberate indifference by FBI toward informant’s conduct | No recognized Georgia tort of deliberate indifference | Dismissed—no Georgia cause of action for deliberate indifference |
| Whether the United States committed conversion of Smith’s vehicles | Smith claimed deprivation of possession (trover/conversion) under O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 | United States never had actual possession of the vehicles | Dismissed—conversion requires actual possession, which Smith did not allege |
Key Cases Cited
- Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (explains no general duty to control third parties and recognizes narrow "special relationship" exception based on control)
- Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (violating internal policy does not create FTCA liability absent independently actionable state tort)
- Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2015) (failure to perform federal duties insufficient alone to establish FTCA liability; state tort is required)
- Carter v. Butts Cty., Ga., 821 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (conversion under Georgia law requires actual possession by defendant)
- Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Bradley Center to require legal authority to restrain or control for special-relationship duty)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) pleading)
AFFIRMED.