Amanda Bradshaw v. Barney Samuel Bradshaw
555 S.W.3d 539
| Tex. | 2018Background
- Amanda Bradshaw sought a divorce after Barney Bradshaw was convicted of repeatedly sexually abusing Amanda’s daughter in the Florey Lake home.
- Trial court granted a fault-based divorce for cruelty, found the Florey Lake house to be community property, and awarded Amanda 80% and Barney 20% of the home.
- Barney was incarcerated and thus possessed no personal property; the trial court awarded personal property in each party’s possession to that party (effectively to Amanda).
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s division. The Texas Supreme Court majority reversed; this opinion (Boyd, J., dissenting) would have affirmed.
- Central legal questions: whether the trial court’s property division was an abuse of discretion under Tex. Fam. Code §7.001 and whether the record lacked sufficient evidence to support the award to Barney.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bradshaw) | Defendant's Argument (Barney) | Held (Boyd, J., dissenting) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether awarding any interest in the family home to a spouse convicted of using it to sexually abuse a child is per se unlawful | Amanda: Awarding Barney any interest is "manifestly unfair and unjust" and an abuse of discretion; she urged award of 100% to her | Barney: The trial court considered evidence and law; his 20% award was within court’s discretion | Boyd: Affirmed the trial court; discretionary “just and right” division governs and appellate courts may reverse only for clear abuse of discretion; plurality’s per se rule is impermissible judicially created law |
| Whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s division | Amanda: Never argued insufficiency; consistently claimed evidence supported a disproportionate award to her | Concurring Justices (Devine): Asserted record lacks sufficient inventory/valuation to support division | Boyd: Amanda waived any sufficiency complaint; record contained testimony and valuation evidence (house $120,000, combined assets >$200,000); trial court had basis to act |
| Whether appellate court may reverse on a ground not raised below (sua sponte) | Amanda: Relied on abuse-of-discretion review, not an evidentiary sufficiency complaint | Court of Appeals/Majority: Majority created or applied a legal rule disallowing any award to such a convict in narrow circumstances | Boyd: Error-preservation rules preclude appellate courts from reversing on unraised grounds; this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues not preserved |
| Proper standard of review for disproportionate property division | Amanda: Requested reversal under abuse-of-discretion standard (manifestly unfair/unjust) | Devine concurrence: Emphasized sufficiency of evidence as independent ground | Boyd: Abuse-of-discretion governs; legal/factual sufficiency are relevant only as factors, not independent grounds; factual sufficiency review is for courts of appeals only |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980) (abuse of discretion occurs if property division is punitive rather than a just and right division)
- Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982) (trial court has wide discretion in dividing community estate; reversal only for clear abuse)
- Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) (presumption that trial court exercised discretion properly; reversal only for clear abuse)
- Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977) (abuse of discretion where separate property is misallocated between spouses)
- McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976) (appellate role limited to determining abuse of discretion in property divisions)
- In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 2017) (appellate courts do not defer to trial court’s legal determinations; distinguishes interpretation from application)