Amador v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust
665 F. App'x 733
10th Cir.2016Background
- Edward Amador and Wayne Wilke, retired participants in the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust (the Trust), received monthly benefits but were served IRS notices of levy. The Trust notified them that benefits would be withheld unless they returned forms; they did not.
- The Trust honored the IRS levies and began sending plaintiffs’ benefits to the IRS.
- Plaintiffs first sued in state court (removed to federal), which dismissed the action in part for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; their appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
- Plaintiffs then filed untimely appeals with the Trust; the Trust denied them as untimely and cited its obligation to comply with ERISA and federal tax law.
- Plaintiffs sued again in federal court; the district court granted summary judgment for the Trust, concluding the denials were not arbitrary or capricious. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeals (60-day deadline) | Appeals rule only applies to eligibility denials, not to IRS-levy-related benefit reductions | Trust’s appeals provision applies broadly to any adverse benefit determination and requires written notice within 60 days | Denial as untimely was reasonable; application of the 60-day deadline was not arbitrary or capricious |
| Duty to honor IRS notices of levy | Trust acted improperly by surrendering benefits to IRS | Trust must comply with IRS levies and interpret plan to conform with ERISA and federal tax law | Trust reasonably honored IRS levies; doing so was consistent with federal law and plan terms |
| Standard of review (ERISA plan interpretation) | (implicit) Trust should be subject to de novo review | Trust reserved authority to interpret plan; arbitrary-and-capricious standard applies | Court applied deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review and found Trust’s interpretations reasonable |
| Pro se pleading leniency vs. procedural rules | Plaintiffs’ pro se status warrants liberal construction | Pro se parties must follow procedural rules, including administrative deadlines | Pro se status did not excuse failure to exhaust or meet procedural time limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for district court grants of summary judgment)
- Weber v. GE Group Life Assur. Co., 541 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 2008) (arbitrary-and-capricious review applies when plan reserves interpretive authority)
- Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013) (courts construe pro se pleadings liberally)
- Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (pro se parties must follow procedural rules)
- Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (courts will not supply additional factual allegations or construct legal theories for pro se litigants)