Alyssa D. Bustamante v. State of Missouri
2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 996
Mo. Ct. App.2015Background
- In 2009, 15-year-old Alyssa Bustamante killed a 9‑year‑old and led police to the body; she was certified to be tried as an adult and charged with first‑degree murder and armed criminal action.
- Bustamante pled guilty in January 2012 to second‑degree murder and armed criminal action (a blind plea); the court accepted the plea and later sentenced her to consecutive life and 30‑year terms.
- While her case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012), holding mandatory life‑without‑parole for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional; counsel had litigated Missouri’s statute as applied to juveniles before the plea.
- Bustamante filed a Rule 24.035 post‑conviction motion alleging (1) ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failing to fully advise her about Miller, (2) that the first‑degree murder statute was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and (3) ineffective assistance for not challenging her juvenile certification.
- After an evidentiary hearing (testimony from Bustamante and both plea attorneys), the circuit court denied relief; Bustamante appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea counsel was ineffective for not fully advising Bustamante about Miller before her blind plea | Counsel pressured her to plead before Miller; she would have gone to trial if she knew Miller might eliminate mandatory LWOP | Counsel discussed Miller/Graham, filed a challenge, advised risks of trial; failure to predict Miller is not ineffective; evidence against Bustamante was strong | Denied — court found counsel advised her, credited counsel testimony, and no prejudice shown |
| Whether § 565.020 (first‑degree murder) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles because it authorized mandatory LWOP | Charging under § 565.020 deprived her of a constitutional sentencing scheme, so she would not have pled guilty | Miller does not categorically bar LWOP for juveniles; Missouri Supreme Court (Hart, Nathan) allows discretionary LWOP after individualized sentencing | Denied — court followed Hart/Nathan; statute not void as applied |
| Whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to seek remand to juvenile court (challenge certification) | Counsel should have sought remand because certification record failed to consider her emotional/mental state | Movant presented no evidence at the hearing to support the claim; certification record showed proper relinquishment | Denied — claim abandoned for lack of proof and no impact on plea voluntariness |
| Whether remand was required to assess timeliness of amended post‑conviction motion | (Raised by State below) | Appellate court: remand unnecessary because amended motion was adjudicated on merits and pro se claims were included | Court denied State’s remand motion as pointless and reviewed merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juvenile mandatory life‑without‑parole unconstitutional)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juveniles cannot receive LWOP for non‑homicide offenses)
- State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013) (Miller allows discretionary LWOP after individualized sentencing)
- State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2013) (same principle as Hart)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Haskett v. State, 152 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. standard applying Strickland in post‑conviction context)
- State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. banc 1997) (guilty plea must be voluntary and knowing)
- Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. banc 2005) (guilty plea waives most ineffective‑assistance claims except those affecting plea voluntariness)
- Jones v. State, 211 S.W.3d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (prejudice standard in plea contexts)
- Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015) (timeliness and abandonment of amended post‑conviction motions)
- Childers v. State, 462 S.W.3d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (remand unnecessary where amended motion and pro se claims were adjudicated)
- State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. banc 1994) (failure to predict a change in law is not ineffective assistance)