Alvin Leroy Morton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
684 F.3d 1157
11th Cir.2012Background
- Morton was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after two penalty phases.
- Defense presented antisocial personality disorder as mitigation through an expert (Dr. DelBeato) and lay testimony about Morton’s troubled childhood.
- Florida Supreme Court upheld convictions but vacated death sentences due to prosecutorial misconduct and ordered new penalty phase; on retrial Morton II- penalty phase again yielded death sentences.
- At retrial, Urso and Swisher presented Dr. DelBeato’s testimony again, along with childhood-mitigation witnesses; Morton’s juries again recommended death.
- Morton filed postconviction motions and federal habeas petitions challenging defense performance; district court denied relief; a certificate of appealability was granted on one issue related to Dr. DelBeato’s testimony.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial under AEDPA, concluding Florida did not unreasonably apply Strickland and Morton failed to show prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Florida’s application of Strickland reasonable regarding DelBeato’s testimony? | Morton argues DelBeato’s testimony was inherently harmful and irresponsible. | Florida reasonably concluded counsel’s decision to call DelBeato was a strategic, reasonable choice. | Yes; Florida’s decision was reasonable under Strickland. |
| Can presenting antisocial personality disorder as mitigation ever be ineffective assistance per se? | Morton contends it is per se deficient to present antisocial personality disorder for mitigation. | The court recognized ASD as valid mitigating factor under Eddings; not per se deficient. | No; ASD can be valid mitigation under federal law. |
| Did trial counsel’s decision to call DelBeato at resentencing satisfy Strickland’s deferential standard? | Calling DelBeato, given prior damaging testimony, was ineffective. | Counsel could have reasonable strategic reasons to present DelBeato again. | Yes; reasonable strategic justification supported by deferential review. |
| Did Morton suffer prejudice from the alleged deficient performance? | DelBeato’s testimony likely changed outcome. | Weight of aggravation factors was substantial; mitigating evidence remained weak. | No; there is not a reasonable probability of a different outcome. |
| Did Morton’s own preclusion of further testing bar prejudice analysis? | If more testing could have shown brain impairment, prejudice could exist. | Morton prevented further testing; cannot claim prejudice from failure to obtain it. | Yes; defendant’s own preclusion defeats prejudice claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (mitigating factors include any aspect of defendant's character)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes deficient performance and prejudice standard)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (highly deferential AEDPA review in Strickland cases)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (requires deference to state court's reasoned decision under Strickland)
- Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2005) (state court’s analysis may be nonessential to resolution of claim)