Alton Crain v. City of Selma, 952 F.3d 634

Alton Crain, an African-American Selma, Texas resident, sought to buy City-owned Parcel 5; the City solicited sealed bids with a December 19, 2014 deadline.
City used a third-party appraisal (Stouffer) setting a higher minimum bid but did not inform bidders; Crain bid based on county value, revised his bid before deadline, and Bustos (Hispanic) submitted the highest bid and won.
Crain alleged procedural irregularities: City employees allegedly coached Bustos in City Hall just before the deadline, Bustos’s bid bore a later “Received” stamp, and other envelopes may have lacked required parcel numbers.
Crain later ran for City Council; his ballot application lacked a birthdate, was ruled incomplete for the regular ballot, and his attempted write-in filing was rejected as untimely amid a confusing deadline notice.
Crain sued under the Fair Housing Act (disparate treatment) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (equal protection) and moved for spoliation sanctions alleging defendants altered City Hall surveillance video showing the alleged coaching.
The district court denied sanctions, appointed counsel for discovery, and granted summary judgment for defendants; Crain appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed both denials.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Spoliation / sanctions for alleged altered video footage	Crain: City altered/destroyed surveillance footage of Casias speaking with Bustos and should be sanctioned	Defendants: No footage of Casias ever existed on preserved video; IT preserved and produced footage; camera had motion-activation/obstruction issues	Affirmed denial: no clear evidence footage ever showed Casias or was altered; no bad-faith spoliation shown
FHA disparate-treatment claim re: denial of bid	Crain: City’s irregular bid process and alleged preferential coaching of Bustos show race was a factor in awarding Parcel 5	Defendants: Bustos was highest conforming bidder (exceeded Stouffer appraisal); offered legitimate, non‑racial reason for sale	Affirmed summary judgment: even if procedural errors occurred, no evidence race was a significant motivating factor or pretext for discrimination
§ 1983 equal protection claim re: ballot access	Crain: City’s handling of his application and misleading deadline caused racially discriminatory denial of ballot access	Defendants: Neutral application rules applied; Crain failed to include birthdate and was the only applicant so deficient; no disparate treatment of similarly situated candidates	Affirmed summary judgment: no evidence of discriminatory intent or different treatment of similarly situated candidates

Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1990) (abuse-of-discretion standard for discovery rulings)
Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 707 (5th Cir. 2015) (definition and treatment of spoliation)
Whitt v. Stephens Cty., 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008) (adverse-inference instruction in spoliation contexts)
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (on viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party)
Inclusive Comms. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019) (FHA disparate-treatment framework / prima facie elements)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996) (unsound or unfair actions do not alone prove race-motivated discrimination)
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (pretext requires showing the proffered reason is false and discrimination was real reason)
Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004) (elements for § 1983 equal protection racial-discrimination claim)
Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2014) (summary-judgment standard on appeal)