264 A.3d 835
R.I.2021Background
- On December 17, 2017, Horace Johnson (driver) and Carlton Johnson (passenger) were seriously injured in a Providence auto accident; Arbella Mutual insured Horace with $100,000 guest-occipient OOB coverage.
- On January 25, 2018, Carlton’s counsel sent a written demand to Arbella for the $100,000 policy limit; Arbella responded on February 28, 2018 accepting that demand.
- Carlton and his mother filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court on March 6, 2018; Arbella removed the case to federal court.
- The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.2 did not apply because a “civil action” requires that a judicial proceeding already be underway.
- Carlton appealed; the First Circuit certified the question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court: what is the meaning of “civil action” in § 27-7-2.2?
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court held the statute’s language is plain: “civil action” means a judicial proceeding commenced by filing a complaint and required documents and fees, so § 27-7-2.2 does not apply to the pre-suit offer here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of “civil action” in §27-7-2.2 | “Civil action” means the injured party’s legal right to seek relief; covers pre-suit written offers | “Civil action” requires a judicial proceeding begun by filing a complaint | Court: “Civil action” means a judicial proceeding commenced by filing a complaint and required documents/fees (Super. R. Civ. P. 3) |
| Meaning of “at the time the action accrues” | Language shows the action exists prior to filing | Accrual of a cause of action is distinct from commencement of a civil action | Court: A cause of action may accrue pre-suit, but it is not a “civil action” until suit is filed |
| Relevance of DeMarco and Summit | Those opinions support applying §27-7-2.2 to pre-suit settlement efforts | Those cases do not control here; fact patterns differ and did not define “civil action” as plaintiff urges | Court: DeMarco and Summit are not dispositive; plain statutory language governs |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Johnson, 952 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2020) (First Circuit certified the question to the R.I. Supreme Court)
- Thrift v. Thrift, 75 A. 484 (R.I. 1910) (classic definition: civil action is a court proceeding for enforcement/redress of private right)
- DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I. 2011) (involved settlement offers made both pre- and post-commencement of suit)
- Summit Ins. Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523 (R.I. 2019) (case did not base its analysis on §27-7-2.2 and is not controlling here)
- Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 282 (R.I. 1999) (noting §27-7-2.2 language is neither complex nor ambiguous)
- Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 1993) (noted legislative purpose of accelerating settlements)