Altenburg v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
1:16-cv-03374
D. MarylandJun 26, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Jeffrey Altenburg and Judy Wood sued Caliber Home Loans, Inc. and U.S. Bank (as trustee for LSF9), alleging FDCPA, MCDCA, and MCPA violations based on foreclosure actions initiated while LSF9 lacked a Maryland collection-agency license under MCALA.
- Altenburg defaulted on a 2007 refinance; LSF9 acquired the loan and Caliber serviced it; a Howard County foreclosure filed March 9, 2016, was later dismissed on motion by Altenburg.
- Wood’s loan went to foreclosure with a sale on December 31, 2014; later collection communications and a 1099 were sent in 2015–2016.
- Plaintiffs contend LSF9 was a “consumer debt purchaser” and needed an MCALA license to authorize foreclosures; defendants dispute that MCALA applies to foreign statutory trusts or that the conduct constitutes regulated collection activity.
- The court considered recent Maryland appellate authority (Sharma‑Marvastian) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Henson v. Santander when resolving whether MCALA and federal debt‑collector rules apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LSF9 (a foreign statutory trust) had to be licensed under MCALA before authorizing foreclosure | LSF9 is a debt purchaser/collector and must be licensed to collect via foreclosure | LSF9 is not required to be licensed (statutory trust or other exemptions); MCALA doesn’t apply | MCALA applied; in light of Sharma‑Marvastian, a foreign statutory trust that attempts to collect via foreclosure must be licensed |
| Whether Caliber/LSF9 violated FDCPA/Maryland consumer statutes by prosecuting foreclosures while unlicensed | Filing foreclosures while LSF9 was unlicensed violates FDCPA, MCDCA, and MCPA | No violation because entity exempt or not a ‘‘collector’’ under MCALA/FDCPA | Altenburg stated a plausible FDCPA claim against Caliber and state‑law claims against LSF9/Caliber survive; claim against LSF9 under FDCPA was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs |
| Timeliness of Wood’s claims under FDCPA (one‑year limitation) | Equitable tolling or continuing violations save Wood’s claims; 1099 and other acts occurred within one year | Claims are time‑barred; 1099 is not a collection activity under FDCPA; no fraudulent concealment shown | Wood’s claims are dismissed as time‑barred; 1099 issuance is not an FDCPA collection act and tolling not warranted |
| Availability of declaratory relief for alleged FDCPA/Maryland statutory violations | Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that LSF9/Caliber cannot collect while unlicensed | Declaratory relief is unnecessary or improper when statutory remedies under FDCPA/MCDCA/MCPA are available | Declaratory relief (Count I) dismissed; court declines to grant discretionary declaratory relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (limits on conclusory allegations in pleadings)
- Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) (treatment of entities as debt collectors under FDCPA)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (scope of Rooker–Feldman doctrine)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (original Rooker authority)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (Rooker–Feldman doctrine explained)
- Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) (federal courts must give preclusive effect to state judgments as state law dictates)