Alston v. State, 71 A.3d 13

Kevin C. Alston was tried and convicted of wearing/carrying a handgun and possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a prior conviction; the parties stipulated he had a prior felony drug conviction that was not charged as a crime of violence.
At sentencing the trial court imposed an enhanced mandatory 5-year no-parole term under Article 27, § 449(e) (later recodified as PS § 5-133), plus additional consecutive/concurrent terms.
The Court of Special Appeals vacated one duplicitous conviction but affirmed the enhanced § 449(e) sentence; Alston sought certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, decided whether § 449(e) applies when the prior conviction is a nonviolent felony, and initially addressed (but later withdrew) a separate question about whether the rule of lenity required sentencing under the more lenient CL § 5-622.
Relying on this Court’s holding in Stanley v. State, the Court held § 449(e) requires a prior conviction that is both a felony and a crime of violence, vacated the enhanced § 449(e) sentence, and remanded for resentencing under the appropriate statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Alston)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether § 449(e) authorizes an enhanced mandatory 5‑year no‑parole sentence when the prior conviction is a nonviolent felony	Alston: § 449(e) does not apply because his prior felony was nonviolent; enhanced penalty requires a prior crime of violence	State: § 449(e) may be applied because the statute reaches persons with prior felonies; prosecution could elect the harsher provision	Held: § 449(e) is clear and conjunctive; it requires a prior conviction that is both a felony and a crime of violence — Alston’s sentence under § 449(e) vacated and case remanded for resentencing.
Whether the rule of lenity requires sentencing under the more lenient CL § 5‑622 when two statutes punish identical conduct with different penalties	Alston: where two statutes overlap and legislative intent is unclear, lenity caps sentence at the lesser penalty	State: this is a charging/prosecutorial discretion issue; Batchelder permits prosecution under either statute and sentencing under the statute charged	Held: The Court initially addressed and applied lenity (capping sentence under the lesser statute where legislative intent is unclear) but later withdrew Part B as moot; the operative holding in this opinion is limited to vacating the § 449(e) sentence based on Stanley.

Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175 (Md. 2005) (§ 449(e) requires both a prior felony and a crime of violence; conjunctive elements must be proved)
Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 (Md. 2003) (statutory structure of § 449 analyzed; two-element framework identified)
Waye v. State, 231 Md. 510 (Md. 1963) (disfavored repeal by implication; disparity in penalties for identical conduct should be harmonized and may limit punishments)
U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (U.S. 1979) (where two federal statutes overlap, government may prosecute under either and sentence under the statute charged; Supreme Court rejected lenity reduction where statutes independently operate)