840 F.3d 363
7th Cir.2016Background
- Eric Alston was placed on probation in Dane County in 2010 and later selected for a law-enforcement-run Special Investigation Unit (SIU) program for high-risk probationers.
- SIU participation carried a warning that probation violations would prompt vigorous revocation efforts; Alston was arrested for an alleged violation in December 2011.
- At the April 2012 revocation hearing, ALJ Beth Whitaker disclosed she had previously attended an informational SIU presentation given by law enforcement and described the presentation as emphasizing the program’s resources and a "last-chance" approach.
- Alston moved to continue and to substitute a different, neutral adjudicator; the motion was denied and Whitaker revoked his probation in a written order.
- The Administrator, Dane County Circuit Court, and Wisconsin Court of Appeals all affirmed; the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held attendance at the informational SIU meeting did not create an impermissible risk of bias.
- Alston sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied the petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding the state court decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law nor based on unreasonable factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ Whitaker’s prior attendance at an SIU law-enforcement presentation created an unconstitutional risk of bias at the revocation hearing | Alston: attendance created a high probability of bias warranting disqualification | State: the presentation was an informational seminar with no case-specific discussion; no impermissible risk of bias | Held: No impermissible risk of bias; attendance did not violate due process |
| Whether the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision was "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent | Alston: state court ignored requirements from Gagnon and Caperton (distinct components; objective risk analysis) | State: court applied governing law and addressed objective risk of bias | Held: Not contrary to clearly established federal law |
| Whether the state court unreasonably applied federal law under AEDPA | Alston: court mischaracterized the meeting and over-relied on lack of case-specific discussion and ALJ’s self-assessment | State: regular judicial trainings are common; absence of case specifics supports objectivity; ALJ’s statement was not the sole basis | Held: Application was reasonable under AEDPA standards |
| Whether the state court made an unreasonable factual determination | Alston: ALJ’s remark suggested some relevance of the training to her decision, contradicting no-bias finding | State: record shows no prejudgment or case-specific information; factual finding was supported | Held: State court’s factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (fair hearing requires unbiased adjudicator)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (due process protections at probation revocation hearings; two-component analysis)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (objective test for probability of bias)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (definition of "contrary to" under AEDPA)
- Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373 (Seventh Circuit AEDPA procedural guidance)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference under AEDPA; difficulty of proving unreasonable application)
- Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658 ("well outside boundaries" standard for unreasonable application)
- McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634 (§2254(d)(2) requires ignoring clear and convincing evidence to grant relief)
- Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696 (state factfinding must not be objectively unreasonable)