Alpine Village, Inc. v. City Of Oak Harbor, 74869-6

Background

Donna Mott owned eight contiguous lots in Oak Harbor and recorded (1991–1992) a Binding Site Plan (BSP) and related Pier Point CC&Rs and a declaration of easement intended to serve successive condominium phases (up to 8) shown on the BSP.
The BSP set a construction schedule with a seven-year window for completing phases; only phases 1–4 were completed before that window expired.
Mott later sold the undeveloped remainder to Alpine Village; Alpine sought to develop those lots and submitted a preliminary site plan to the City, which required evidence of rights to existing ingress/egress and utility easements.
Alpine sued for a declaratory judgment that the recorded declaration of easement benefited Alpine’s lots (not just lots developed under the original Pier Point BSP); parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and stipulated no material factual disputes.
The trial court held (1) the easement was intended to benefit only property developed pursuant to the Pier Point BSP, and (2) the easement did not take effect for Alpine’s lots because Mott’s deed to Alpine did not reference the declaration; the court granted summary judgment for Pier Point. Alpine appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the recorded declaration of easement was intended to benefit Alpine’s lots (undeveloped after BSP expiration) or only lots developed under the Pier Point BSP	The easement’s broad ‘‘owners . . . of the above-described property’’ language and dual reference to county records and the BSP show intent to benefit the land generally, including Alpine	The declaration’s ‘‘WHEREAS’’ clauses and express references tie the easement to serving Pier Point condominium buildings/phases as shown in the BSP; no language extends benefit to post-expiration, non-BSP development	The court held the easement was limited to property developed under the Pier Point BSP and did not extend to Alpine’s separate development
Whether the easement ever took effect with respect to Alpine’s specific lots because Mott’s deed to Alpine did not reference the declaration	Alpine argued the recorded easement burden ran with the land and thus benefitted Alpine as owner of the described property	Pier Point emphasized that Mott referenced the easement in condominium deeds but did not reference it in the deed to Alpine, and the declaration’s scope was tied to BSP development	The court relied on limiting language to decide as a matter of law that the easement applied only to BSP-developed property; it did not need to resolve whether the easement ever took effect as to Alpine’s lots
Whether the easement should be judicially modified under the changed-conditions doctrine	Alpine raised modification as an alternative remedy on appeal	Pier Point opposed modification and argued it was inappropriate on summary judgment without factual development	Court declined to address modification because it is equitable and fact-intensive and should be first considered in the trial court
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the declaratory judgment claim	Alpine argued genuine issues existed about intent and applicability	Pier Point argued the instrument’s plain language and surrounding documents resolve intent as a matter of law	Court affirmed summary judgment for Pier Point, finding no material factual dispute and that the written instruments unambiguously limited the easement’s beneficiaries

Key Cases Cited

McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 163 Wn.2d 393 (2008) (standard of review for declaratory judgment summary judgment reviewed de novo)
Coppernoll v. Reed, 155 Wn.2d 290 (2005) (appellate review of summary judgment and inferences for nonmoving party)
Stalter v. State, 151 Wn.2d 148 (2004) (summary judgment standard)
Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co., 49 Wn.2d 165 (1956) (easement is an interest in land)
Schwab v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn. App. 742 (1992) (interpretation of easement instruments and intent)
Butler v. Craft Eng. Const. Co., 67 Wn. App. 684 (1992) (contract principles applied to easement construction)
Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493 (2005) (contract language given ordinary meaning; context rule)
Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657 (1990) (context rule for contract interpretation)