63 Va.App. 45
D. Nev.2014Background
- Kevin Almy, pro se, filed a § 1983 action and repeatedly filed numerous motions and documents, prompting the court to order him to obtain leave before filing further motions.
- On September 27, 2013 the court issued eleven interlocutory orders resolving various claims; Judge Mahan adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
- Almy sought leave to file an application for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal those eleven orders under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(b).
- Defendants moved to strike Almy’s COA request, arguing it was procedurally improper, meritless, and violated the court’s leave-to-file order.
- The Ninth Circuit previously dismissed Almy’s earlier appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the challenged orders were not final or appealable.
- The magistrate judge denied Almy’s request for COA and granted defendants’ motion to strike, concluding the COA request was meritless, would not materially advance the litigation, and violated court orders; the motion was stricken from the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept. 27, 2013 orders are certifiable as final under § 1291 (or via Rule 54(b)) | Almy sought certification to immediately appeal the eleven orders as final | Orders are not final; Rule 54(b) entry is unwarranted because claims are legally/factually related | Denied — orders are not final; Rule 54(b) relief inappropriate because claims are similar and risks of piecemeal appeals outweigh need for separate judgment |
| Whether interlocutory certification under § 1292(b) is appropriate | Almy argued interlocutory review of eleven orders is warranted | Defendants argued Almy failed to meet § 1292(b)’s three criteria and appeal would delay proceedings | Denied — Almy did not show a controlling question of law, substantial difference of opinion, or that immediate appeal would materially advance termination |
| Whether the court should strike Almy’s COA motion as procedurally improper | Almy characterized the filing as a response, not a motion, attempting to avoid the prior leave requirement | Defendants argued the filing violated the court’s leave order, was meritless, and cluttered the docket | Granted — court exercised inherent authority to strike fugitive documents and denied as sanction/management measure |
| Whether granting COA would materially advance litigation | Almy implied appellate review could resolve key issues now | Defendants argued appellate review unlikely to be accepted and would likely delay resolution | Held — granting COA would not materially advance the case and likely cause delay |
Key Cases Cited
- De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990) (flagrant abuse of the judicial process by excessive filings may be sanctioned)
- Couch v. Telescope, Inc., 611 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (definition of a final decision under § 1291)
- Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (final decision ends litigation on the merits)
- Morrison–Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1981) (Rule 54(b) reserved for unusual cases; avoid multiplying appeals)
- In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982) (§ 1292(b) criteria for interlocutory certification)
- City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court must certify interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) before appellate review)
- Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2010) (court may strike or sanction filings to manage docket)
- Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court’s inherent power to manage its docket)
