Alma L. Gomez and Alberto F. Gomez, Individually and as Next Friend of Jorge Elias Gomez, a Minor, and on Behalf of the Estate of Jorge Elias Gomez, a Minor And Yolanda Medellin, Individually and as Next Friend of Jesus Medellin v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
04-16-00342-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 26, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Gomez family and Medellin) sued American Honda for alleged manufacturing, design, and marketing defects under strict liability and negligence after a minor's death.
- At trial-court level, Honda moved for a no-evidence summary judgment asserting plaintiffs had no admissible expert proof of defect or causation and that manufacturing-defect claims were abandoned.
- Honda’s motion generally argued that plaintiffs’ liability experts had been excluded and that plaintiffs lacked experts to support defect and causation elements.
- Plaintiffs responded noting previously designated experts (Andrews and Roberts).
- In its reply brief, Honda for the first time argued the remaining experts’ opinions were unreliable and expanded its challenge to expert reliability.
- Justice Rios dissented, arguing Honda’s no-evidence motion lacked the Rule 166a(i) specificity required and that Honda impermissibly raised new, substantive grounds in its reply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Honda’s no-evidence motion specified the elements lacking evidence as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) | Plaintiffs argued they had designated experts (Andrews, Roberts) and thus raised evidence; motion was insufficiently specific. | Honda argued plaintiffs lacked any admissible experts to prove defect or causation. | Dissent: Honda’s motion was fundamentally defective for failing to state specific elements lacking evidence. |
| Whether Honda could rely on new expert-reliability challenges raised first in its reply | Plaintiffs relied on their expert designations and objected to new arguments raised late. | Honda expanded argument in its reply to challenge expert reliability and urged exclusion. | Dissent: A movant may not use a reply to raise new grounds or provide required specificity; doing so is improper. |
| Whether failure to specify elements in a no-evidence motion permits summary judgment | Plaintiffs contended lack of specificity prevents summary judgment. | Honda contended absence of experts justified judgment. | Dissent: Absent specificity, no-evidence MSJ cannot support summary judgment as a matter of law. |
| Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment based on Honda’s motion and reply | Plaintiffs urged denial due to procedural defects and existing experts. | Honda obtained summary judgment in trial court and majority affirmed. | Dissent: Summary judgment was improper because Honda’s motion did not meet Rule 166a(i) specificity and reply raised new grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009) (Texas Supreme Court on specificity of summary-judgment grounds)
- McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993) (motion must stand or fall on grounds expressly presented)
- Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam, 53 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) (movant may not use reply to supply required specificity)
- Jose Fuentes Co., Inc. v. Alfaro, 418 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013) (no-evidence motion failing to state specific elements is fundamentally defective)
- Garcia v. Garza, 311 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010) (movant may file reply but may not amend motion or raise new independent grounds in reply)