418 F.Supp.3d 1009
M.D. Fla.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (Allstate entities) insure vehicles and allege Defendants (Auto Glass America and owner Isaly) solicit insureds, obtain assignments of benefits (AOBs), and bill insurers for windshield replacements.
- Plaintiffs allege Defendants charge supra-competitive prices (average ~$900 vs. typical ~$350) and sometimes perform replacements when lower-cost repairs would suffice. Plaintiffs refused to pay alleged overages, prompting Defendants to file over 1,000 state-court suits seeking the overages. Plaintiffs claim overages exceed $200,000 and litigation costs exceed $400,000.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages under tortious interference, FDUTPA, FHSSA, the FTC cooling-off Rule, FMVRA, and unjust enrichment.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (standing, abstention) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state claims), and argued Rule 9(b) and abstention doctrines applied.
- The court denied dismissal in part, finding Article III standing for the asserted claims, rejected abstention, denied most 12(b)(6) challenges, but dismissed Counts VI and VIII (those premised on FMVRA) with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for FDUTPA claims | Plaintiffs (insurers) suffered concrete injury from exposure to liability, payment of overages, and litigation costs traceable to Defendants’ conduct | Plaintiffs are not FDUTPA "consumers" and lack injury/causal traceability | Plaintiffs have standing; insurers may sue under FDUTPA; injury and traceability adequately pleaded |
| Standing for non-FDUTPA claims (FHSSA, FMVRA, unjust enrichment) | Same injuries (overages, suits) suffice to support these standalone claims | If no FDUTPA standing, non-FDUTPA claims fail because premised on FDUTPA | Plaintiffs have standing on Counts V, VI, X generally, but FMVRA-based claims later fail on the merits for lack of statutory coverage |
| Pleading standard for FDUTPA (Rule 9(b) applicability) | FDUTPA claims need only satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility; they do not sound in fraud here | Defendants urge Rule 9(b) heightened pleading for fraud-like allegations | Court declines to apply Rule 9(b); FDUTPA allegations meet Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility |
| FDUTPA and per se FDUTPA liability (based on FHSSA, FTC Rule, FMVRA) | Defendants violated solicitation and disclosure laws; such violations support FDUTPA per se claims | Defendants contend statutes do not apply because insureds did not pay (insurer did) | FHSSA and FTC Rule could apply (sale/price threshold not negated by insurer paying); FMVRA does not apply because statute protects the "customer" and plaintiffs are not customers; Count VIII (FMVRA-based FDUTPA) dismissed |
| Unjust enrichment (Counts V, X) | Plaintiffs conferred payments (benefits) to Defendants and retention would be inequitable given statutory violations/ unnecessary replacements | Defendants deny unlawfulness or that benefit was unjust | Unjust enrichment claims (Counts V and X) adequately pleaded and survive dismissal |
| Abstention (Colorado River and Brillhart) | Plaintiffs argue federal forum is proper to resolve nationwide multiplicity of state small-claims suits | Defendants urge abstention because thousands of state suits overlap and state courts first obtained jurisdiction | Court rejects Colorado River and Brillhart abstention: factors weigh against abstention (risk of piecemeal litigation and convenience favor federal resolution); Brillhart inapplicable to mixed claims |
| Declaratory relief | Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief to prevent ongoing conduct | Defendants say declaratory count duplicates other claims and seeks adjudication of past conduct | Declaratory judgment count survives; federal court has discretion and Plaintiffs alleged future risk justifying relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concrete and particularized injury requirement)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing as threshold jurisdictional inquiry)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Rule 8 plausibility and inapplicability to legal conclusions)
- Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (abstention requires exceptional circumstances)
- Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004) (Colorado River factors in Eleventh Circuit)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal duty to exercise jurisdiction and analysis of parallel proceedings)
- Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (exposure to liability in underlying lawsuits can constitute injury-in-fact)
- Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942) (principles governing dismissal of declaratory judgments)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (proximate-cause/traceability discussion for standing)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (traceability standard for standing)