206 Conn.App. 284
Conn. App. Ct.2021Background
- On May 21, 2014, Charles Allen, an off‑duty East Granby police officer, chased a suspected shoplifter in the Buckland Hills mall parking lot after hearing police radio broadcasts.
- The suspect entered a vehicle driven by Reshawn Champion; when Allen attempted to intervene he was struck by the car/door and injured.
- Allen sued the mall owner (Buckland Hills) and its security contractor (AlliedBarton) for negligence; defendants pleaded, inter alia, that Champion’s actions were an independent superseding cause.
- At trial the jury found Buckland Hills not negligent, found that Champion’s conduct was intentional or criminal and not foreseeable, and concluded Champion’s conduct was a superseding cause of Allen’s injuries.
- Allen appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) its superseding‑cause instruction (failure to define “criminal act”), (2) its instruction about General Statutes § 54‑1f (off‑duty police duties), and (3) failure to instruct on the heightened duty owed to invitees.
- The Appellate Court affirmed: it held the superseding‑cause charge was correct when read as a whole and that any instructional defects on § 54‑1f or invitee duty were not shown to be harmful given the jury’s superseding‑cause finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Superseding‑cause instruction | Court failed to define "criminal act" and improperly required intentional/criminal conduct | Instruction was proper; Barry and Snell allow superseding‑cause when intervening act is intentional/criminal | Affirmed: charge, read as a whole, was correct; jury reasonably could find Champion’s conduct intentional/criminal and unforeseeable, so not misled |
| §54‑1f / off‑duty officer duty | Court treated §54‑1f as a mere restraint rather than an affirmative duty to intervene and omitted felony definition, impairing foreseeability analysis | Charge accurately limited off‑duty police powers and required a reasonable‑prudent‑officer standard under the circumstances | Affirmed: even if charge imperfect, error not shown harmful because jury’s superseding‑cause finding made plaintiff’s conduct irrelevant |
| Invitee / heightened duty to protect from third parties | Mall owed heightened duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts; jury should have been instructed accordingly | Heightened duty is tied to foreseeability/premises risk and does not override superseding‑cause analysis; plaintiff’s theory centered on exercising police powers, not a premises defect | Affirmed: any failure to give the requested invitee charge was not harmful given jury’s finding that Champion’s act was an unforeseeable superseding cause |
| Harmful error / standard of review | Instructional errors affected verdict | Appellees: plaintiff bears burden to show error was harmful; instructions must be read as a whole | Affirmed: appellant failed to prove any instructional impropriety was reasonably probable to have misled the jury or affected the verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 (Conn. 2003) (limits use of superseding‑cause doctrine when later act is negligent; preserves doctrine for unforeseeable intentional/criminal acts)
- Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720 (Conn. 2019) (clarifies Barry and confirms superseding‑cause instruction still applies where intervening intentional or criminal act is alleged)
- Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 (Conn. 1995) (trial court need not tie causation to the specific legal classification of a crime to resolve proximate cause)
- Kos v. Lawrence + Memorial Hospital, 334 Conn. 823 (Conn. 2020) (appellant bears burden to show jury instruction error was harmful; harmfulness standard explained)
- Farmer‑Lanctot v. Shand, 184 Conn. App. 249 (Conn. App. 2018) (jury instructions must be read as a whole and judged by total effect)